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RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENCE: HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY-A QUESTION
OF ADMISSIBILITY OR CREDIBILITY FOR CRIMINAL COURTS?
On October 1, 1982, a young female was raped. She could
neither recall the details of the incident nor her attacker's identity.
After being hypnotized, however, she identified Mr. Green as her as-
sailant. Under what conditions will the courts accept hypnotically
enhanced testimony into evidence against Mr. Green?
One recent decision, Chaiman v. State,' has held that hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony is per se admissible. State v. Hurd,2 on the
other hand, admitted the testimony into evidence only with safe-
guards. A third decision, State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court,3 excluded
the testimony under the Fre test.
This note explores the legal and practical aspects of using hyp-
notically enhanced testimony in criminal trials. Part I introduces the
reader to hypnotically enhanced testimony. Part II discusses judicial
history, noting the early tendency to admit hypnotically enhanced
testimony. Parts III, IV, and V present and criticize the three ap-
proaches that courts have recently used to analyze hypnotically en-
hanced testimony's admissibility. Part VI suggests a future trend
toward excluding post-hypnotic statements while continuing to ad-
mit pre-hypnotic statements.
I. Introduction
Hypnosis has been defined as "a state of half-sleep or trance, in
which an individual (the subject) is induced to function at an uncon-
scious level of awareness in response to verbal instruction from an-
other individual (the hypnotist)." '4 The present controversy
surrounding the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony results from
two factors: hypnosis's recognition as a valuable investigative tool
and increased judicial awareness of the many problems inherent in
its use.
By using hypnosis during criminal investigations, law enforce-
I 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). See notes 46-51 infia and accompanying text.
2 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). See notes 52-69 infia and accompanying text.
3 644 P.2d 1266 (Ariz. 1982). See notes 70-117 infra and accompanying text.
4 12 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 446 (1981).
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ment officials can stimulate the memories of victims and witnesses. 5
While under hypnosis, one can recall even traumatic events that he
had forgotten or suppressed.
6
Although courts are aware of hypnosis's investigative worth,
they have also recognized hypnosis's reliability problems as an evi-
dence-gathering device. Though hypnosis has been a valuable thera-
peutic technique for years, recent decisions warn of the risks in
relying upon it for forensic purposes. 7 Psychologists criticize the the-
ory that the memory records information capable of "videotaped
replay."" Many variables alter the information that is "refreshed" or
incorporated into the subject's memory.
Most recent decisions mention a hypnotized subject's hypersug-
gestivity and hypercompliance. 9 Hypnosis induces increased sugges-
tiveness.10 The hypnotist's suggestions are not always explicit, but
are often unintended cues he transmits through his questions, non-
verbal conduct, or demeanor." Hypersuggestivity is coupled with
hypercompliance-the subject's desire to please the hypnotist.'
2
Hypercompliance results from the subject's trust or confidence in the
5 Kadish, Brofman, Peskin & Baccus, The Poygraph, Hypnosis, Truth Drugs and Psychological
Stress Evaluator- Admissibility in a Criminal Trial, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 593, 604 (1981).
6 A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 632 (2d ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as MOENSSENS & INBAU]. See People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775, 781
(1982),modi ld andreh'g denied, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), cert. denied (U.S. Oct.
4, 1982)(No. 82-78); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246, 246 A.2d 302,311-312 (1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). The Harding court noted that "modem medical science has now
recognized that memory of painful events can sometimes be restored by hypnosis." 5 Md.
App. at 246, 246 A.2d at 311-312.
7 See State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1284-1285 (Ariz. 1982); Peo-
ple v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 47, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (modifying 641 P.2d 775 (1982)); People
v. Hughes, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929,930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496
Pa. 97, 103, 436 A.2d 170, 173 (1981). As one expert has commented, "Hypnosis helps to
build a trusting relationship between doctor and patient which is important in the treatment
process." Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to Freshen the Memory of Witnesses or Victims, TRIAL, Apr.
1981 at 56, 58. Dr. Levitt supports the distinction between hypnosis's clinical use and its
forensic use.
8 See, e.g., 31 Cal. 3d at 31 & 62 n.43, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 250 & 270 n.43 (citing Orne, The
Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'LJ. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311,321
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Orne]).
9 See, e.g., 31 Cal. 3d at 64-65, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271; 452 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
10 See, e.g., Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness,
68 CALIF. L. REv. 313, 316 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Diamond] (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 563 (1976) as follows: "[a] state that resembles sleep but is induced
by a hypnotizer whose suggestions are readily accepted by the subject.").
11 31 Cal. 3d at 64, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271; Diamond, supra note 10, at 333.
12 31 Cal. 3d at 64, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
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hypnotist, which the hypnotist promotes to ensure cooperation.' 3
The potential for hypercompliance and hypersuggestivity increases
when the subject knows the hypnotic session's purpose is to help him
remember facts.'
4
The desire to please the hypnotist causes what scientists call con-
fabulation. Confabulation occurs when the subjects cannot recall de-
tails and therefore fill these memory gaps with fantasy. 15
Accordingly, hypnotically enhanced memories combine actual
events, both relevant and irrelevant to the case in question, with
fantasized details that the subjects unconsciously create to form a
"logical whole."16 The memories may be replete with detail, but de-
tail in no way guarantees their accuracy.1 7 When the subjects
awaken, they cannot disassociate their pre-hypnotic memories from
their present memories.1 8 Moreover, subjects have firm, albeit un-
warranted, convictions regarding their enhanced recollections.1 9
II. Historical Analysis
A. EarlP Case Law
Attempts to introduce hypnotic evidence in criminal trials be-
gan with an 1897 California case, People v. Ebanks,20 in which the
defendant called a hypnotist to testify as an expert witness. The de-
fendant made exculpatory statements while under hypnosis, and his
attorney sought to introduce these statements through the hypnotist's
testimony.2' The California Supreme Court refused, curtly stating
that American law does not recognize hypnotism as a reliable mem-
ory-enhancing technique.
22
13 Note, Safeguards Against Suggestiveness: A Means forAdmissibility ofHypno-lnduced Testimony,
38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197, 200 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Safeguards].
14 Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 104, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981).
15 Safeguards,supra note 13, at 200 n.23 (quoting E. MONOGHAN, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS 86 (1980)). A subject can be hypnotized progressively as well as regressively,
and thus induced to foretell future events. Studies show that subjects will go to great lengths
to comply with the hypnotist's request for details. Following hypnosis, the subject reports his
progressive "memories" with the same conviction as those of actual past events. 31 Cal. 3d at
59, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 268 (citing D. HINTZMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MEM-
ORY 303 (1978)).
16 496 Pa. at 105, 436 A.2d at 174 (quoting Diamond, supra note 10, at 335).
17 31 Cal. 3d at 65, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
18 31 Cal. 3d at 65-66, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272. See also note 142 infra.
19 496 Pa. at 105, 436 A.2d at 174. See also Diamond, supra note 10, at 339-340.
20 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
21 Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
22 Id. The court did not specifically state why it did not recognize hypnotism, only that
it would be an illegal defense. The case implies that the court regarded hypnosis as a mystical
[Vol. 58:1011
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Until relatively recently, courts have not had to decide whether
a witness may testify about events recalled after hypnosis. 23 In 1968,
the Maryland Court of Appeals first addressed hypnotically en-
hanced testimony's admissibility in Harding v. State.24 The Maryland
court allowed a rape victim to testify about the attack, even though
her memory was hypnotically enhanced during the initial investiga-
tion.25 The victim could not recall details of the attack prior to hyp-
nosis, but gave an identification after hypnosis; the court found that
these circumstances raised a credibility issue for the jury.26 Despite
Harding's failure to address its perceived lack of an admissibility
problem,27 other courts quickly adopted its approach. 28
B. Use of the Frye Test
Courts followed the Harding approach quite consistently for
twelve years. As hypnosis's investigative use intensified, however,
courts began to re-examine Harding's analysis.29 The courts became
increasingly aware of hypnosis's suggestive nature and questioned its
reliability as an evidence-gathering tool.3
0
process rather than a reliable memory-recollection technique. Given the date of the case,
1897, such an interpretation appears sound.
23 Diamond, supra note 10, at 313. Courts have not had to decide this issue simply be-
cause hypnosis had not been used extensively by law enforcement personnel.
24 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cerl. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
25 5 Md. App. at 234-235, 246 A.2d at 305.
26 Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
27 In rendering its decision on the admissibility of the victim's testimony, the Harding
court stated that it found no difficulty with admitting hypnotically enhanced testimony. 5
Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372, 374-375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Creamer v.
State, 232 Ga. 136, 137-138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241-242 (1974); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423,
433-434 (Mo. 1980); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-122, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-429 (1980);
State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 602, 494 P.2d 434, 436 (1972); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App.
1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971). For examples of courts adhering to the Harding approach in
civil matters, see Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-1070 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller
v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-510 (9th Cir. 1974). But see Greenfield v. Com-
monwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974), where the court stated that "[m]ost experts
agree that hypnotic evidence is unreliable because a person under hypnosis can manufacture
or invent false statements." 214 Va. at 715, 204 S.E.2d at 419.
29 For an excellent critique of the Harding decision see Dillhoff, The Admissibiliy of Hypnot-
ically Inaenced Testimony, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1977). Forjudicial criticism of Har-
ding, see People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 154-158, 310 N.W.2d 306, 311-312 (1981),
and State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274, 1277-1278 (1981). Harding's precedential
vitality within its own jurisdiction appears tenuous. See Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427
A.2d 1041 (1981).




Consequently, some courts have recently applied the "general
acceptance" test, a test used extensively with other scientific evi-
dence. The general acceptance test first received judicial recognition
in Fqe v. United States.3' F.e enunciates the standard of admissibility
for expert testimony based on scientific techniques or principles.
32
The Fe test asks whether a given technique or principle has gained
general acceptance in the scientific community as a reliable evidence-
gathering tool.3 3 The test thus prevents unproven or unsound scien-
tific methods from misleading the jury.34 Prior to the Fe test, an
expert's scientific opinion regarding hypnosis was essential to the evi-
dence's admissibility. The jury determined the expert opinion's
weight on a case-by-case basis.3 5 Although the opinion's foundation
had to be generally accepted as reliable within the scientific commu-
nity,3 6 this foundation required less than scientific certainty.3 7 Frye
attempts to distinguish opinion from "scientific evidence," which ju-
ries often regard as synonymous with truth.38 Using the Fye test in
criminal trials, where the defendant faces possible imprisonment,
guarantees that guilt or innocence will not be based upon insuffi-
ciently tested or verified premises.
39
Until 1980, courts had not consistently applied the Fye test to
hypnotically enhanced testimony.40 Courts had previously applied
Fe only to results obtained from mechanical devices, such as the
tolygraph.41 Since hypnosis lacks such mechanical testing proce-
dures, the early courts did not use Fe to test its admissibility.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first clearly articulated the basis
for applying the Fe test to hypnotically enhanced testimony in State
31 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
32 Gianelli, General Acceptance of Skntjif Tests-F ye and Byond, in SCIENTIFIc AND Ex-
PERT EVIDENCE 11, 18 (E. Imwinkelried ed. 1981).
33 See 293 F. at 1014.
34 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264 (1982).
35 See, e.g., 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302.
36 Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978).
37 644 P.2d at 1285 (quoting 1 M. UDALL &J. LIVERMORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE 212 (2d
ed. 1982)).
38 Id.
39 MOENSSENS & INBAU, supra note 6, at 7.
40 See Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506; Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205
S.E.2d 240; State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312. But see State v. LaMountain, 125
Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980); People v. Harper, 111 IIll. App. 2d 204, 250 N.E.2d 5 (1969);
People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1978); Greenfield v. Common-
wealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E. 2d 414 (1974).
41 See 644 P.2d at 1281-1282, wherein the court lists other areas where the Frye test has
been used.
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v. Mack.42 Despite recognizing that one cannot compare hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony and mechanical testing results, the Minne-
sota court rejected the state's argument that Fye did not apply.4
3
The court followed Foe's analysis because none of the five expert
witnesses could testify with certainty during the trial whether memo-
ries retrieved by hypnosis were truth, falsehood, or confabulation.
44
The experts' uncertainty, according to the Minnesota court, proved
hypnosis's lack of general recognition as a reliable investigative
tool.
45
III. The Three Current Approaches to Hypnotically Enhanced
Testimony
A. Chapman: Per Se Admzsibility
After re-examining hypnosis's use and effects, state courts have
formulated three distinct approaches to hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony's admissibility problem. One approach, exemplified by Chap-
man v. State,46 finds hypnotically enhanced testimony per se
admissible.
The Chapman court characterized hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony as any other refreshed recollection47 and analogized hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony to testimony refreshed by reading
documents or letters.48 The court stated that the issue was the testi-
mony's credibility rather than its admissibility.
49
The Chapman approach does not ignore the dangers inherent in
using hypnotically enhanced testimony. It recognizes that hypnosis
may distort the subject's memory and supply additional facts to his
recollection beyond those mentally stored. 50 The Chapman analysis
leaves hypnosis's problems to the factfinder as credibility questions.
The testimony's value is determined by attacking its credibility
through cross-examination. 5' The jury is left to evaluate hypnosis's
effect on the witness and his testimony's credibility.
42 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
43 Id. at 769.
44 Id. at 768.
45 Id.
46 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). In Chapman, the defendant, during a burglary, struck the
owner of the residence with a hammer. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the victim's
testimony was inadmissible because such testimony was hypnotically refreshed. Id. at 1281.
47 Id. at 1284.
48 Id. (quoting Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-1070 (9th Cir. 1975)).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1283-1284.
51 Id. at 1284.
[October 1982]
RECENT DECISIONS
B. Hurd: Admissibility with Safeguards
Recent cases such as State v. Hurd52 adopt a more detailed ap-
proach. Recognizing the problems that hypnosis raises, courts have
recently admitted hypnotically enhanced testimony into evidence,
subject to stringent safeguards.
53
The safeguards attempt to balance hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony's value against the dangers inherent in its use. Parties seeking
to introduce hypnotically enhanced testimony must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the safeguards were satisfied.54 The
burden is a heavy one, requiring strict compliance. This middle-of-
the-road approach avoids the problems with bothper se admissibility
and total exclusion.
In Hurd, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that hypnosis can
be considered reasonably reliable if it yields recollections as accurate
as those of an ordinary witness.55 Thus, the court accepted hypnosis
as a reasonably reliable method of restoring a person's memory if
conducted properly and used only in "appropriate cases."56 Hurd
stated that appropriate cases include those where pathological condi-
tions such as traumatic neurosis impair the witness's memory.57 In-
appropriate cases include those where hypnosis is used simply to
gather details or to check a witness's inconsistent statements. 58
The hypnotic session is properly conducted, according to the
New Jersey court, when the procedures involved are reasonably relia-
ble.59 To ensure procedural reliability the Hurd court imposed six
safeguards. First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in using
hypnosis must conduct the session.60 Second, the professional should
be independent of, and not regularly employed by, the prosecutor,
investigator, or defense.61 Third, any information that law enforce-
ment personnel or the defendant gives to the hypnotist prior to the
52 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). In Hurd, the defendant allegedly attacked and as-
saulted a woman while she was sleeping in the bedroom of her ground floor apartment. After
undergoing hypnosis, the woman identified the defendant as her attacker. Id. at 532, 432
A.2d at 89.
53 See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
54 86 N.J. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
55 Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95.
58 Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 96.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
61 Id.
[V"ol. 58:101]
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hypnotic session must be recorded.62 Fourth, before inducing hypno-
sis, the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed descrip-
tion of the facts as the subject remembers them.63 The hypnotist
should carefully avoid influencing the subject by either asking sug-
gestive questions or adding new details.64 Fifth, all contacts between
the hypnotist and the subject must be recorded.65 Finally, only the
hypnotist and the subject should be present during any part of the
hypnotic session, including pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hyp-
notic interview.
66
The court in Hurd believed that the above six safeguards would
protect the evidence from possible distortion without excluding trust-
worthy evidence. 67 Once the testimony is admitted, the opponent
may challenge only the reliability of the particular procedures em-
ployed.68 He may not challenge the reliability of hypnosis in
general.
69
C. Collins, Shirley, and Hughes: Admissibiliy and the Frye Test
The most recent approach to hypnotically enhanced testimony,
adopted in State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 70 discusses the testi-
mony in terms of admissibility rather than credibility. The Collins
court treated hypnosis as a scientific procedure and conditioned ad-
62 Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 96.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
66 Id. These safeguards were suggested by Dr. Martin T. Orne, a prominent psychologist
specializing in hypnosis. An earlier case, People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427
N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980), had set forth nine safeguards similiar to those in Hurd. The McDowell
safeguards include: (1) the person conducting the hypnotic session should be a qualified pro-
fessional (psychiatrist or psychologist) with training in hypnosis; (2) the professional should be
independent of the prosecution, defense, or investigator; (3) the professional should be given
only essential information and only in written form; (4) all contact between the professional
and the subject should be videotaped; (5) neither the police, prosecutor, defense, nor any of
their representatives should be present at the hypnotic session; (6) the hypnotist should hold
an extensive pre-hypnotic interview, which includes exploring the subject's judgment and
intelligence; (7) prior to hypnosis, the professional should record a description of the subjects
recollection of the facts; (8) the professional should exercise extreme caution to avoid adding
any new elements to the subject's memory or giving implicit or explicit cues during his con-
tact with the subject; and (9) all facts resulting from the hypnotic session should be indepen-
dently corroborated to the extent possible. 103 Misc. 2d at 834-835, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 182-184.
67 86 NJ. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
68 Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
69 Id.
70 644 P.2d 1266 (Ariz. 1982). In Collins, the defendant was charged with forty counts,
including kidnapping, sexual assault, and rape. Seven victims testified against the defendant
after having had their memories hypnotically refreshed. Id. at 1269.
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missibility upon satisfying the Fye test.7 1 Collins held that hypnoti-
cally enhanced testimony was inadmissible because it did not meet
the Fye test.72 The court concluded that the scientific community
had not yet verified that hypnosis produces reliable results. 73 The
Collins court rejected the notion that the courts should be free to de-
cide both reliability and foundational questions concerning hypnosis
on a case-by-case basis and instead opted for the Fge standard.
7 4
The Collins court noted that a case-by-case analysis consumes valua-
ble trial resources and might yield conflicting decisions.7 5 More im-
portantly, the jury may give undue weight to evidence produced by a
scientific procedure.76 Foe serves the "salutary purpose of preventing
the jury from being misled by unproven and ultimately unsound sci-
entific methods.
'77
In People v. Shirlty,78 the California Supreme Court adopted the
Frqe test for determining hypnotically enhanced testimony's admissi-
bility. The court concluded that hypnotic evidence failed to meet
the Fye standard and ruled that the testimony of a witness who had
undergone hypnosis to restore her memory of the events in issue was
inadmissible.7 9 The inadmissibility applied to all matters regarding
the events in issue from the time of the hypnotic session forward.80
The court explained its reliance on Fqe as follows. Fge applies
to evidence produced by scientific techniques.8 ' Although the hyp-
notic technique is scientific, administering the techniqueprodces the
witness's testimony.82 The witness's induced recall depends upon,
and cannot be disassociated from, the underlying scientific method.
83
Accordingly, the testimony is only as reliable as the hypnotic process
71 Id. at 1282-1285.
72 Id. at 1294.
73 Id. at 1287.
74 Id. at 1282.
75 Id. at 1285.
76 Id. at 1284 (citing Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 102, 436 A.2d 170, 173
(1981)).
77 644 P.2d at 1285 (quoting People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264
(1982)).
78 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1982). In Shirl/y, the defendant was convicted of
rape and unlawfully entering the complaining witness's apartment. Before trial the prosecu-
tion hypnotized the victim to fill gaps in her story. Id. at 23, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
79 Id. at 67, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 53, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d
1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976)). See text accompanying notes 31-39 sufira.
82 31 Cal. 3d at 53, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
83 Id. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
[Vol. 58:101]
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itself, and must be judged by Fe's admissibility standards.8 4 The
court in Shirl concluded that hypnotically enhanced testimony will
not be admissible until the relevant scientific community accepts
hypnosis as a reliable technique for memory retrieval.8 5
Both Collins and Shirley rejected proposals to adopt the Hurd
standards.86 The Shirlq court expressed doubt that the safeguards
would adequately alleviate all possible dangers.87 The safeguards fail
to account for the witness's unwarranted confidence in his enhanced
testimony, his commingling of confabulation with actual recall, and
the irijection of undue delay and confusion into the judicial process. 88
Even if the safeguards were adequate, strict compliance would be
difficult to ensure.89 The safeguards would spawn new litigation, for
both sides would demand exhaustive discovery, need numerous ex-
pert witnesses, and necessitate additional pretrial hearings.90 The
court in Shirlq concludes that trial courts would be expected to an-
swer scientific questions that the experts could not.91
Both Collins and Shirlq justify their exclusion rules on constitu-
tional grounds.92 The court in Collins noted that the defendant's
sixth amendment right to confrontation also allows the trier of fact to
observe the witness's demeanor and weigh his credibility.93 The
court in Shirl explained that a witness's credibility is shielded from
effective attack because of confabulation, confusion of pre- with post-
hypnotic memory, and the increased conviction regarding the en-
84 31 Cal. 3d at 49, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
85 Id. at 54, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
86 644 P.2d at 1292-1293; 31 Cal. 3d at 51, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 262-263. The Collins court
relied heavily on the Pennsylvania court's analysis in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa.
97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
87 31 Cal. 3d at 39, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255. The court examined the Hurd safeguards and,
regarding the suggested use of videotaped sessions, notes that even Hurd recognizes thht ex-
perts examining videotape would find it difficult to identify possible cues. The court in Shirly
concludes, "If even an expert cannot confidently make that identification, it is vain to believe
that a layman such as a trial judge can do so." Id. at 39 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 n.24.
88 Id. at 39, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255. The court cites these risks as having been recognized in
Hurd, but maintains that even the Hurd safeguards fail to confront them. Id. See also Collins,
644 P.2d at 1285.
89 31 Cal. 3d at 39-40, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
90 Id. at 40, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255. See a/so Colbis, 644 P.2d at 1294; (quoting People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 254-255).
91 31 Cal. 3d at 40, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
92 644 P.2d at 1274-1275, 1292; 31 Cal. 3d at 43-44, 50-51, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 257-258,
262.




hanced memory. 94 Hypnosis transforms the witness into a "new"
witness.95 Under these conditions, any meaningful cross-examination
would be severely restricted,96 if not eliminated. 97
The admissibility of statements made prior to hypnotic sessions
is a pending controversy. In Collins, the court initially held a hypno-
tized witness incompetent to testify to both his pre- and post-hyp-
notic statements. 98 The court found hypnosis too unreliable for
forensic purposes. 99 Upon a motion for rehearing, however, the court
concluded that hypnosis had received the scientific community's gen-
eral acceptance as an investigative tool. 00 The court recognized that
the total exclusion rule would deprive the police of a valuable source
of leads.'01 The court noted that applying the rule literally would
produce harsh results. For example, a rape victim, once hypnotized,
could not even testify to the fact that she was raped. 102 Employing a
cost-benefit analysis, the Collins court, upon rehearing, found the wit-
ness competent to testify to facts remembered and related prior to the
hypnotic session.103
Collins adopted a series of safeguards to minimize the risks at-
tendant to hypnotically enhanced testimony. The court required
preserving the hypnotic recall in written, tape-recorded, or prefera-
bly videotaped form. 0 4 A record of the hypnotic session must be
kept to minimize commingling pre- with post-hypnotic recall. 0 5 Fi-
nally, the proponent must give timely notice to opposing counsel of
94 31 Cal. 3d at 63-66, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271-272.
95 644 P.2d at 1274.
96 644 P.2d at 1292 (citing State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280
(1980)).
97 31 Cal. 3d at 44, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (quoting State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769
(Minn. 1980)).
98 644 P.2d at 1269.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1295.
101 Id. Respondents opposed the rehearing motion, arguing that it was designed to take
advantage of the Arizona Supreme Court's recent reconstruction. Prior to the rehearing mo-
tion, a justice in the prior majority opinion retired. After replacing the retired justice, the
court granted the rehearing, because of important public policy issues.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1296. The Shirl, court modified its decision on June 4, 1982, and omitted a
previous statement which left open the possible use of procedural devices to preserve pre-
hypnotic testimony. See 641 P.2d at 805. The court upon rehearing, however, appears to
adopt a total incompetency rule regarding the viability of pre-hypnotic statements. See 31
Cal. 3d at 48 n.29, 67-68, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 260 n.29, 272-73.
104 644 P.2d at 1296.
105 Id.
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his intent to offer hypnotically enhanced testimony. 0 6
Recent decisions evince a judicial trend toward admitting pre-
hypnotic testimony. The Nebraska Supreme Court,10 7 though adopt-
ing aper se inadmissibility rule, stated that it would allow testimony
as to pre-hypnotic facts. In order to do so, the court must be able to
reliably determine that the witness remembered the facts prior to
and independent of the hypnotic session.'08 Both Michigan'0 9 and
Minnesota 01 have reached similiar decisions despite recently adopt-
ing per se exclusion rules."'I In Pennsylvania, a lower state court
recently interpreted a state supreme court decision excluding testi-
mony as a pro se inadmissibility rule, which allowed pre-hypnotic
statements.' 12
People v. Hughes" 3 confirms the trend. In Hughes, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, considered for the first time the
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced recall.' 1 4 The court adopted
the Fgye standard and held hypnotically enhanced testimony inad-
missible as a matter of law.' ' 5 The court noted that even the Mary-
land Supreme Court, which created the Harding analysis, had
forsaken the Harding approach for that of Fe."16 Moreover, Hughes
ruled that testimony recalled prior to hypnosis was admissible, citing
Collins as authority." 17
106 Id.
107 State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648 (Neb. 1981).
108 Id. at 655 (Clinton, J., concurring).
109 People v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981).
110 State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981).
111 The Michigan court had adopted its per se exclusion rule in People v. Gonzales, 108
Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981), while the Minnesota court had adopted a similar
rule in State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
112 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 439 A.2d 805 (Pa. Super. 1982). The court interpreted
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981), as adopting what the court
termed apro se rule of inadmissibility regarding hypnotically enhanced testimony in criminal
cases where the witness had absolutely no recall of pre-hypnotic facts. The court dist-
inguished Taylor, in which the witness had demonstrated a present recall of pre-hypnotic
facts. 439 A.2d at 807.
113 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). In Hughes, the defendant appealed his con-
viction for rape, burglary, and assault. The victim had testified at trial after having had her
memory hypnotically refreshed (and possibly drug-induced with sodium pentothal).
114 Earlier New York cases had defined the issue as one of credibility, not admissibility.
See, e.g., People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980).
115 452 N.Y.S.2d at 929 and 931.
116 Id. at 930-931. See note 29supra.
117 452 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
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IV. Critical Analysis of the Three Approaches
A. Chapman: Per Se Admissibility
The Chapman court held that hypnotically enhanced testimony
was admissibleper se and relegated questions regarding hypnosis's re-
liability to the jury as credibility issues. 18 Rigid cross-examination
theoretically enables the jury to evaluate hypnosis's effects on the wit-
ness's credibility."19
The per se admissibility approach, however, ignores hypnosis's
overall reliability in producing accurate recall. The attack before the
jury determines only the credibility of particular witnesses and proce-
dures. 120 Hypnosis in general is never questioned because the court
readily admits the hypnotically enhanced testimony. Contrary to
Chapman's reasoning, cross-examination cannot effectively assist the
jury in evaluating hypnosis's effects. Dr. Martin T. Orne, a promi-
nent psychiatrist, states that hypnosis bolsters a witness's conviction
in his version of the story, making his credibility impervious to cross-
examination.121
This analysis says little, if anything, about hypnosis's acceptance
by the scientific community. The courts assume that jurors can eval-
uate hypnotic procedures' reliability. 22 Such an assumption is un-
founded, however, since even prominent psychologists specializing in
hypnotically enhanced testimony disagree as to its reliability.123 The
analysis simply adopts a rule ofper se admissibility, and all problems
with hypnosis's use go merely to the weight of the evidence. The
court does not participate in any way, but instead avoids
involvement.
Chapman's analogy of hypnotically enhanced testimony to testi-
mony refreshed by reading letters124 is overly simplistic. The two ap-
proaches clearly differ in their effect. The letter represents concrete
118 638 P.2d at 1282.
119 86 N.J. at 535, 432 A.2d at 91.
120 In Chapman, a police officer, rather than a psychiatrist or a psychologist, conducted the
hypnotic session. 638 P.2d at 1281.
121 Orne, su ra note 8, at 332.
122 See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
123 Compare Diamond, supra note 10, at 348-349 (emphatically stating that hypnotically
enhanced testimony is not and cannot be reliable), with Spector & Foster, Admissibility ofHyp-
notic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO STATE L.J. 567, 591 0977) (stating
that hypnotically enhanced testimony is no more inaccurate than any witness's testimony) and
Ome, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 61, 98-99 (1981) (stating that circumstances exist when hypnosis can be applied if
certain safeguards are followed).
124 See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
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evidence; the jury watches as the witness reads and remembers. After
hypnosis, however, the jury sees only the effects-the results of proce-
dures performed earlier. Moreover, a jury may interpret hypnosis to
be more reliable merely because it is scientific in nature.
B. Hurd: Admissibility with Safeguards
The approach established in Hurd admits hypnotically enhanced
testimony when certain procedural safeguards are present. 25 The
court attempts to balance hypnosis's inherent problems with the pos-
sibility of losing trustworthy evidence.
26
Hurd first requires that hypnosis be used only in appropriate cir-
cumstances, i.e., where a pathological condition prevented the sub-
ject from remembering.127 Hypnosis, according to Hurd, is less
reliable when used solely to gather more details from a witness. 128
This distinction is shattered as soon as it is digested, because the Hurd
court itself states that in either case, a significant possibility of creat-
ing self-serving fantasy exists.t29
Next, Hurd establishes procedural safeguards.1 30 Each proposed
standard safeguards against abuse in particular instances. But, as in
Chapman, hypnosis's general reliability is neither questioned nor
opened to the opponent's attack.'
3 '
While the Hurd court articulates its fears about using hypnosis, it
states that the safeguards eliminate cases where hypnosis is unlikely
to produce reasonably reliable recall. 32 The New York Supreme
Court's Appellate Division has stated that hypnosis should be used
rarely and under the best possible conditions since, absent extreme
caution, the subject's true memory may be contaminated.
33
Hurd's conclusion that the safeguards guarantee reliable testi-
mony is tenuous. The Hurd opinion discusses at length the problems
with hypnosis and its resulting inaccuracies, 3 4 but the court insists
that hypnosis is as reliable as normal recall.' 35 The court does not
address the confabulation problem, a phenomenon incapable of de-
125 86 N.J. 525, 545, 432 A.2d 86, 96. See notes 60-66 supra and accompanying text.
126 See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
127 86 N.J. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
128 86 N.J. at 544, 432 A.2d at 96. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
129 86 N.J. at 544, 432 A.2d at 96.
130 Id. at 545-546, 432 A.2d at 96-97. See notes 60-66 supra and accompanying text.
131 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
132 Id. at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97.
133 People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 837, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181, 184 (1980).
134 See 86 N.J. at 539-543, 432 A.2d at 93-95.
135 Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
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tection.136 Therefore, even if the session complies with all safeguards,
confabulation negates any predictable accuracy level. Rigid cross-
examination can expose consciously contrived facts, but unconscious
fabrications and distortions become part of the subject's recall, which
he vehemently believes and defends.
3 7
Hurd tells us that the human memory's fallibility fundamentally
challenges our system of justice. 138 Placing this determination with
jurors not only subjects them to conflicting scientific testimony re-
garding hypnosis, but it requires them to understand the human
mind's intricacies.1 3 9 Because experts cannot agree on hypnotically
enhanced testimony's reliability, 140 the court's expectation that jurors
will intelligently handle the issue is unrealistic. Compliance with the
proposed safeguards fails to eliminate the danger that the testimony's
prejudicial effect could outweigh probative value.
C. Collins, Shirley and Hughes: Admissibility and the Frye Test
While the most recent judicial trend adopts Fgre and allows tes-
timony regarding pre-hypnotic facts, it strays from logic. Courts
adopting Fgye have done so to confront the problems hypnosis
presents: hypercompliance, hypersuggestivity, confabulation, a hyp-
notized witness's inability to separate pre-hypnotic from post-hyp-
notic recall, and his unshakable conviction that his new "memory" is
correct. These problems significantly increase the possibility of taint-
ing the witness's testimony, and ought to induce courts to hold all
previously hypnotized witnesses incompetent to testify.' 4 ' A witness
cannot possibly disassociate his pre-hypnotic from his post-hypnotic
memory. 42 As the court in Shirley stated, it would be irrational to
allow a witness to judge which portions of his testimony were pro-
duced by the hypnotic session.
143
The recent trend ignores the problem of restricted cross-exami-
nation of previously hypnotized witnesses.44 A hypnotic session pro-
136 See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
137 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
138 86 N.J. at 542, 432 A.2d at 95.
139 Id.
140 See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
141 496 Pa. at 104, 436 A.2d at 174.
142 See Diamond, supra note 10, at 336-338. Diamond recognizes that subjects may experi-
ence "post hypnotic source amnesia," the inability to discern that certain facts were learned
under hypnosis. After the hypnotic session, the subject believes these facts to be his own prior
thought. Id. at 336.
143 31 Cal. 3d at 68-69, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
144 Justice Doerr, dissenting in Hughes, explained that the majority justifies excluding hyp-
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duces a "new" memory bolstered by a confidence and conviction
formerly absent. 45 When cross-examining a witness, counsel risks
eliciting additional, unreliable recall contaminated by hypnosis.'
46
Even the majority in Collins recognized this dilemma, stating that the
high mix of fact and fancy irreversibly alters a witness's demeanor. 147
The post-hypnotic witness provides consistent and sincere testimony
and deprives the factfinder of his most valuable tool to challenge
credibility--cross-examination. 48 Even the best trained expert or
jury cannot separate the witnesses' actual from pseudo-memory.
49
Under the rule announced in Collins, the Arizona Supreme
Court would admit pre-hypnotic testimony only if certain safeguards
were instituted. The court requires a record of the hypnotic session,
yet fails to impose any procedural standards. 50 The court suggested
adopting "some if not all of the Orne standards"' 5' presented in
Hurd. The litigant is left guessing which or how many standards will
suffice. 5 2 A forceful dissent in Collins contends that the drawbacks to
adopting or rejecting standards clearly outweigh the numerous fore-
seeable appeals concerning which safeguards, if any, are sufficient. 53
V. Practical Effects of the Three Approaches
Under the Chapman approach, hypnotically enhanced testimony
is admitted without question. The Chapman approach thus admits
possibly misleading and irrelevant evidence.
The Hurd approach admits the testimony subject to stringent
safeguards. But the safeguards protect against only particular
problems and ignore hypnosis's reliability in general. As in Chapman,
possibly tainted and irrelevant evidence is admitted.
notically enhanced testimony because of two factors: (1) the subject's inability to separate pre-
hypnotic from post-hypnotic recall, and (2) the subject's heightened confidence in his en-
hanced memory. These factors inhibit effective cross-examination and should therefore
render the witness incompetent to testify. 452 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (Doerr, J., dissenting).
145 Comment, Hypnosis.- A Sura'e of Its Legal Impact, 11 Sw. U.L. REv. 1421, 1442 (1979).
146 644 P.2d at 1298 (Gordon, Vice C.J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in
part).




150 644 P.2d at 1296. Courts should require adoption of all the Orne safeguards in Hurd.
See note 155 infta and accompanying text.
151 644 P.2d at 1296.





The Collins/Hughes approach excludes testimony from the time
of the hypnotic session forward, but admits evidence regarding pre-
hypnotic testimony. Such an approach serves two functions: first, re-
jecting post-hypnotic testimony excludes evidence tainted by hypno-
sis; and second, admitting preserved pre-hypnotic testimony allows
the jury to hear possibly vital evidence not tainted by the hypnotic
procedure. As a result, the witness can be hypnotized for investiga-
tive purposes and his pre-hypnotic statements will be preserved. Of
course, safeguards are necessary to preserve such pre-hypnotic state-
ments. Part VI therefore proposes the safeguards that a court should
require.
VI. Conclusion
Hypnosis's increased use as an investigative tool and the wide-
spread recognition of the problems inherent in its use will force
courts to adopt an approach similiar to that of the Arizona Supreme
Court in Collins.154 In future cases, courts will totally exclude all
post-hypnotic testimony but will allow statements remembered and
related prior to the hypnotic session.
Such an approach reflects pragmatism rather than logic. Courts
can no longer punish the party using hypnotic techniques by declar-
ing the previously hypnotized witness mute for trial purposes, while
professing to recognize hypnosis's investigative worth. To ensure pre-
hypnotic statements' reliability, such statements must be properly
preserved in written and tape-recorded or preferably videotaped
form, the hypnotic session must comply with the Hurd safeguards,
and counsel must give his opponent timely notice of intent to use
hypnotically enhanced testimony. 15
5
The dangers inherent in tampering with human memory clearly
justify such an exacting approach in criminal cases. Until the scien-
tific community recognizes that hypnosis produces reliable results,




154 See notes 70-77 & 98-106 supra and accompanying text.
155 These requirements are essentially the same as those in Collins, but they additionally
require the hypnotic session to comply with the Hurd safeguards. See notes 104-106 supra and
accompanying text.
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LABOR LAW-DUAL MOTIVE DISCHARGE
An employer fires an employee. The employee claims his union
involvement motivated the discharge and sues for a violation of sec-
tion 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 The em-
ployer argues that it dismissed the employee for legitimate business
reasons. In fact, the employer may have had a dual motive to dismiss
the employee: a legitimate business reason and an illegitimate anti-
union animus. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) and
various United States Courts of Appeal have reached different con-
clusions on how to deal with these "dual motive" cases.
The confusion concerns two issues: (1) the degree of anti-union
animus necessary to find an NLRA violation and (2) which party
bears the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the vio-
lation.2 A court's view on these issues can have a significant effect on
the outcome of a case.
3
I. The Degree Question
In initially determining what degree of anti-union animus the
NLRA required, the Board and several circuit courts of appeal
1 The National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) provides
that, "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization." The National Labor Relations Act
§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) provides the remedy for a § 8(a)(3) violation. It states that
the Board shall order a person violating the statute "to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter."
2 The Supreme Court will resolve the burden of proof question if it accepts the petition
of certiorari filed in Pettibone Corp. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1982)(unpublished
opinion), cert. fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. May 17, 1982) (No. 81-2116).
InPettibone, the Board found a violation of section 8(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The petition for certiorari squarely asks:
Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in adopting the National Labor Relations
Board's Wright Line standard, which provides that once the Board's General Coun-
sel, makes aprimafacie showing that conduct protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was a motivating factor in an employer's decision the employer mustprove
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the protected conduct.
Pettibone Corp. v. NLRB, Petition for certiorari at i.
This question is crucial to Petibone since "[t]here is no direct evidence that .... the
persons who made the decision not to rehire, were aware of the keypunchers' protected, con-
certed activities." Pettibone Corp. v. NLRB, Petition for certiorari at A2. The allocation of
the burden of proof determines the case's outcome.
3 See, Behring Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 90 (3d Cir. 1982).
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adopted the "in part" test.4 The test states that if protected activities
played any part in causing the dismissal, the employer committed an
unfair labor practice. The presence of an accompanying legitimate
reason is irrelevant. For example, in Carraway Geriatric Centers, Inc.,
5
the employer allegedly discharged the employee, Fletta Gills, for
threatening picket line violence. However, the Board found that the
employer also knew of Gills's protected union activities. Thus, it in-
ferred from the circumstances that the discharge was at least par-
tially motivated by an anti-union bias. The Board held that even a
partially discriminatory motivation made the discharge unlawful.
6
As early as 1953 the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit criticized the "in part" test.7 In 1963, that court proposed the
"dominant motive" test. This test states that where there is both a
permissible and an impermissible motive for discharge, the improper
motive must be dominant for an unlawful discharge to be found.8
In Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. ,9 the NLRB rejected
both the "in part"10 and "dominant motive" tests.1 Instead, the
Board adopted the "but for" analysis that the Supreme Court enun-
ciated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle.
12
Mt. Healthy, although not a labor case, did involve an employee
discharge partly based on the employer's animus towards the em-
ployee's protected conduct. In Mt. Healthy the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed lower court rulings that ordered the em-
ployee's reinstatement because his protected conduct, free speech,
4 E.g., NLRB v. Milco, Inc., 388 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. West Side
Carpet Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Jamestown Sterling Corp.,
211 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1954).
5 243 N.L.R.B. 544 (1979).
6 Id. at 549.
7 NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1953).
8 NLRB v. Lowell Sun Publishing Company, 320 F.2d 835, 842 (1st Cir. 1963) (Aldrich,
J., concurring).
9 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980). Bernard Lamoureux, a shop inspector, alleged that Wright
Line fired him because of union activities. Id. at 1089. Wright Line asserted that
Lamoureux's failure to keep accurate work records cost him his job. Id. at 1090. The Board
ordered Wright Line to reinstate Lamoureux. Id. at 1091.
10 The NLRB criticized the "in part" test because it "ignores the legitimate business
motive of the employer and places the union activist in an almost impregnable position once
union animus has been established." Id. at 1084.
11 Id. at 1087.
12 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, the local school board fired a teacher for telling a
radio disk jockey about a newly created dress code for teachers and for using obscene lan-
guage and gestures in the school cafeteria. Id. at 281-83. The radio comment was protected
under the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. Id. at 284. The obscenity
was not protected.
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played a "substantial part" in the dismissal.13 The Court rejected
the "in part" test and remanded the case to give the employer the
opportunity to prove it would have dismissed the employee even ab-
sent the protected activity.14 The Court noted that "[t]he difficulty
with the ["in part"] rule. . . is that it would require reinstatement in
cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive incident is inevitably
on the minds of those responsible for the decision to rehire, and does
indeed play a part in that decision - even if the same decision would
have been reached had the incident not occurred."1' 5
In rejecting the "in part" test, however, the Supreme Court did
not apply the "dominant motive" test. Rather, as the above quota-
tion suggests, the Court adopted a "but for" test, which focuses on
whether the dismissal would have occurred had the protected activ-
ity not taken place.'
6
In Wzn,'ht Line, then, the Board applied this constitutional "but
for" test to a section 8(a)(3) "dual motive" case. While this test af-
fects the degree question,' 7 it also has a significant effect on the bur-
den of proof question.
II. The Burden of Proof
Under the "in part" test and the "dominant motive" test, the
employee (through the Board)' 8 had the burden of proving the viola-
tion.' 9 Under the "in part" test, the employee met the burden simply
by showing "some evidence of improper motive. '"20 The "dominant
motive" test required a showing of "an affirmative and persuasive
reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose a bad
one" 2' - but the burden remained with the employee.
In adopting the Mt. Healthy "but for" test, the Board also
adopted its shifting burden of proof standard. Essentially, M.
Healthy provides that once the employee shows his conduct was a
13 Id. at 285.
14 Id. at 287.
15 Id. at 285.
16 Id.
17 "[I]n labor cases, as in constitutional cases, we think the 'but for' test is the correct
substantive standard for evaluating the propriety of a reinstatement order." NLRB v. Wright
Line, 662 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1981).
18 The Board's General Counsel represents the employee in § 8(a)(3) cases. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 101.6-101.8 (1981).
19 29 C.F.R. § 101.10(b) (1981) provides that "[t]he Board's attorney has the burden of
proof of violations of section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act."




"substantial" or "motivating" factor in the discharge, the burden
shifts to the employer to satisfy the "but for" test.
22
Although Mt. Healthy involved a constitutional, rather than a
statutory violation, the Board in Wnht Line adopted it totally and
promoted the following two-part test.
23
First, we shall require that the General Counsel [representing the
employee] make aprimafacie showing sufficient to support the infer-
ence that protected conduct was a 'motivating factor' in the em-
ployer's decision. Once this is established, the burden will shift to
the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.
24
Despite its unequivocal adoption of Mt. Healthy, the Board
maintains that the Board's General Counsel must still prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that an unfair labor practice took
place. The Board claims that the "shifting burden" test only requires
that the employer rebut the prima facie case by making out an af-
firmative defense. This requirement, according to the Board, does
not shift the ultimate burden of proof
2 5
The issue remaining after Wrght Line is who bears the ultimate
burden of proof. Despite the Board's assertion, its Wn'ht Line deci-
sion, at least arguably, places the ultimate burden of proof on the
employer. This interpretation, however, has not been uniformly
adopted by the circuit courts.
22 429 U.S. at 287.
23 The Board first distinguished true dual motive from pretext. The distinction centers
on whether or not the employer relied upon the asserted business justification for the dismis-
sals. 251 N.L.R.B. at 1083-84.
The Board admitted that this distinction was helpful but irrelevant for implementing the
Mi. Healthy test. Id. at 1083. The Board attempted to clear the "blurred distinction" be-
tween pretext and true dual motive by calling the employer's justification an affirmative
defense.
[I]n a pretext situation, the employer's affirmative defense of business justifica-
tion is wholly without merit. If, however, the affirmative defense has at least some
merit a "dual motive" may exist and the issue becomes one of the sufficiency of
proof necessary for the employer's affirmative defense to be sustained. Treating the
employer's pleas of a legitimate business reason for discipline as an affirmative de-
fense is consistent with the Board's method of deciding such cases.
Id. at 1084.
It is difficult to explain how a meritorious affirmative defense can be shown without
considering the evidence. The Board's process seems the same conceptually as the pre-
text/dual motive process. The Board just chooses not to use the traditional nomenclature.
24 Id. at 1089.
25 Id. at 1088.
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III. Reaction of the Circuits
A review of the reaction of the various circuits to the Board's
Wright Line decision reveals an acute lack of the decisional uniform-
ity and analytical clarity which the Board had hoped to effectuate
through its Wrght Line decision.26  While the Second 2 7 Seventh,28
Eighth,29 and Ninth 30 Circuits have adopted the Board's "shifting
26 In Wright Line, the Board noted the confusion then existing with regard to the proper
test to be applied in dual motive cases. Thus, the Board stated that
[e]nunciation of the Mt. Healthy test will alleviate the confusion which now exists at
various levels of the decisional process and do so in a manner that, we conclude,
accords proper weight to the legitimate conflicting interests in this area, thereby
advancing the fundamental objectives of the Act.
251 N.L.R.B. at 1083.
27 The Second Circuit first enunciated its support of the Wright Line test in NLRB v.
Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1981). Although the court in that case never
reached the "dual motivation" issue, Judge Newman, in his concurring opinion, indicated the
court's acceptance of the Wright Lie rationale. Judge Newman did not, however, accept the
Wr4%ght Line decision in its entirety. While accepting the "shifting burden" test outlined in
Wright Line, he firmly rejected the Board's elimination of the distinction between "but for"
and "pretext" analysis.
The point is that the Mt. Healthy formula does not always eliminate the distinc-
tion between "pretext" and "dual motivation" cases. The further point is that
analysis of any § 8(a)(3) case can begin with either the "pretext" inquiry as to what
actually happened or the "but for" inquiry as to what would have happened.
Whichever inquiry is first made, a no answer ends the case, and the employer loses;
a yes answer obliges the Board to move on to the other inquiry, or implicitly to
have considered it.
Id. at 43. Thus, this support of Wright Line was less than unequivocal.
The Second Circuit confirmed its support of the Wright Line "shifting burden" test in
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982). Although that case did not
specifically involve a § 8(a)(3) violation, it presented a similar dual motivation issue based
upon a violation of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (Supp. 1978). Thus, the
court in Consolidated Edison analogized to the § 8(a) (3) cases and stated that it was adopting
the Mt. Healthy rule in dual motivation cases.
28 The Seventh Circuit has undauntedly supported the Board's Wright Line decision.
The court adopted the shifting burden of proof test in the first dual motivation case that came
before it after the Board's Wright Lbe decision. Peavey Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460 (7th Cir.
1982). In Peavey, the court followed the First Circuit's lead and adopted the M. Healthy test
with little discussion. Even after the First Circuit abandoned its support of the M. Healthy
rule in Wright Line, see text accompanying note 46 supra, the Seventh Circuit continued to
apply the shifting burden analysis. NLRB v. Town & Country LP Gas Service Co., No. 81-
2182 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 1982). See a/so Pettibone Corp. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 894 (7th Cir.
1982); Justak Brothers & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074, 1077 (7th Cir. 1981).
29 In the only dual motivation case which it has decided since the advent of Wright Line,
the Eighth Circuit held that "there is a 'reasonable basis in law' for the Board's use of the
W4r'ht Line test, and that it may therefore be applied." NLRB v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669
F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Thus, the court in Fixtures adopted the
Wright Line test and pointed to several other circuits which had also adopted Wright Line. Id.
at 550 n.4.
30 The Ninth Circuit outlined its reasons for adopting the Wright Line test in NLRB v.
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burden" test in its entirety, the First, 31 Third,32 Fourth,3
3 and Fifth 34
Circuits have rejected this test. Furthermore, of those courts which
have discussed the Wright Line decision, few have analyzed the bur-
den of proof issue in detail. Consequently, considerable confusion
still exists over the proper burden of proof to be applied in section
8(a) (3) cases.
A. The Sixth Circuit
This confusion is most clearly exemplified by the Sixth Circuit's
Nevis Indus., Inc., 647 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1981). The court stated that the Board's deci-
sion was consistent with the legislative history of the Act, consistent with the reality that the
employer has the best access to proof of motivation, and that it "strikes an acceptable balance
between protection of employees' rights and preservation of employers' rights to discharge
employees for valid business reasons." Id. Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he rule articu-
lated by the Board in Wright Line is a reasonably defensible interpretation of the Act, and is
entitled to acceptance by this Court." Id.
Although the court in Nevir Indus. outlined its own reasons for adopting the Wright Line
"shifting burden" test, it never discussed the rationale underlying the Wight Line decision in
any detail. Thus, like the majority of the circuits, the Ninth Circuit has never thoroughly
analyzed the Wnght Line rule. Moreover, while subsequent decisions in the Ninth Circuit
have supported the Nevis Indus. adoption of Wright Line, none of those decisions have at-
tempted to analyze the "shifting burden" test any more than the court did in Nevir Indus. See
Doug Harley, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir. 1982); Lippincott Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 661 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1981).
31 See text accompanying notes 45-63 infra.
32 See text accompanying notes 64-79 infia.
33 The Fourth Circuit specifically rejected the Board's shifting burden of proof test in
NLRB v. Bums Motor Freight, Inc., 635 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1980). The court in Bums Motor
Freight placed the burden of proving improper motive on the NLRB.
Even when there is evidence ofanti-union animus the Board must still affirma-
tively show that the discharges were improperly motivated. . . . If in fact there
was no cause for discharge, there may well be an inference that the assigned reason
was pretextual. But when cause exists, the Board must show an "affirmative and
persuasive reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose the bad
one."
Id. at 314. See aso, NLRB v. Patrick Plaza Dodge, Inc., 522 F.2d 804, 807 (4th Cir. 1975).
Burns Motor Freight was later upheld in Jeffrey Manufacturing Div. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 944
(4th Cir. 1981). See also Cedar Coal Co. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 1197, 1199 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982).
34 The Fifth Circuit has never specifically rejected the Wight Line decision. However, in
TRW, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1981), the court indicated that, "once the em-
ployer has articulated a legitimate business reason for his action the burden is upon the Gen-
eral Counsel to present substantial evidence that anti-union animus was the 'moving cause' of
the disciplinary measures." Id. at 310. Thus, the court appears to have implicitly rejected the
Wnght Line rule.
Because the court has never clearly articulated its position on this issue, however, and
further, because it has never articulated the reasoning underlying its decision in TRW, some
confusion as to the proper burden of proof in mixed motivation cases still exits in the Fifth
Circuit. See De Anda v. St. Joseph Hospital, 671 F.2d 850, 857 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982).
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decisions. 35 Different panels of the Sixth Circuit have decided dual
motivation cases in different ways. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit's
overall failure to formally adopt any particular causality test in dual
motivation cases indicates that there is some confusion within the
circuit as to the precise state of the law on this issue.
In NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fy Roofing Co., one Sixth Circuit pane 3 6
applied the shifting burden analysis, yet never specifically adopted
the Wright Line test.37 Thus, although this panel held that the em-
ployee would not have been discharged "but for" his protected activ-
ity, the court also stated that a discharge motivated "in part" by an
employee's protected activites violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
38
The Sixth Circuit's confusion was again apparent in Charge Card
Association v. NLRB. 39 In that case, the court's language seemed to
indicate that the Sixth Circuit applied the "dominant motive" test in
dual motive discharge cases.4° However, the court then discussed the
Wright Line rule, but neither adopted nor rejected it. Finally, the
court concluded by stating that its holding would have been the
same under either the "dominant motive" or the "shifting burden"
test.4 ' Overall, the court's consideration of both tests indicates that it
has not firmly adopted Wrght Line.
35 See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Charles Batchelder Co., 646 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1981).
36 Sitting on this panel were Martin and Jones, Circuit Judges, and Reed, District Judge.
37 NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1981). In holding that
discharging employee James Varney in part for his filing several complaints regarding the
safety of company equipment constituted an unfair labor practice, the court said,
"[S]ubstantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Fry has failed to demonstrate that it
would have discharged Varney in the absence of his engaging in the protected concerted
activities." .1d. at 446.
38 Id. The National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) states,
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 157 of this title." § 157 deals with,
among other things, the right of employees as to organization and collective bargaining. 28
U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
Thus, both 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) are addressed
to curtailing unfair labor practices.
39 Charge Card Ass'n v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 272, 275 (6th Cir. 1981). Sitting on the panel
were Engel and Merritt, Circuit Judges, and Porter, Senior District Judge.
40 The court stated that
[t]he proper test for evaluating mixed motive cases is whether punishment of
protected activity or anti-union animus was a dominant motive in the employer's
actions. The burden has been placed on the General Counsel to demonstrate that
absent protected activities the suspension or discharge would not have taken place.
Id.
41 The court noted, "Under either the dominant motive test or the shifting burden as
established in Winght Line, we conclude that the reason for disciplining the employees was to
punish them for engaging in a protected walk-out." Id. at 275.
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The Sixth Circuit's reluctance to specifically adopt the "shifting
burden" test was also evident in its decision in NLRB v. ComGeneral
Co.P42 Although the court there found it unnecessary to address the
dual motivation issue, it questioned the validity of the Wright Line
rule, noting that the "shifting burden" test was in apparent conflict
with the tests applied in Title VII discrimination cases. 43 Thus, the
court expressed uncertainty as to the proper analysis of mixed moti-
vation discharge cases.
Overall, therefore, some doubt exists as to which test will prevail
when the Sixth Circuit decides future dual motivation cases. Al-
though one Sixth Circuit panel has in fact applied the "shifting bur-
den" test,44 it is not clear whether a different panel would presently
apply that test.
Not all of the circuits, however, are as unclear on this issue as the
Sixth Circuit. The First and Third Circuits, in rejecting the Wright
Line rule, have given a clear and detailed analysis of the burden of
proof issue.
B. The First Circuit
The First Circuit originally embraced the Board's Wrikht Line
analysis of mixed motive discharge cases in its opinion in Statler Indus-
tries, Inc. v. NLRB. 45 Later the same year, however, this circuit modi-
fied the Board's Wright Line decision in NLRB v. Wright Line, A
42 NLRB v. ComGeneral Corp., 684 F.2d 367 (6th Cir. 1982). The court here held that
substantial evidence existed to support the NLRB's finding that the discharge of ten employ-
ees was motivated by the desire to discourage union activities in one of ComGeneral's plants.
Id. at 370. Sitting on the panel were Engel and Contie, Circuit Judges; Weick, Senior Cir-
cuit Judge.
43 The court noted that the "shifting burden" test used by the Board in Wright Line relies
on the Supreme Court's decision in Mt Healthy. It further noted that this shifting burden test
is in apparent conflict with the Supreme Court's decision under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act as outlined in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The
court did not state, however, whether analysis of mixed motive cases should proceed under
M. Healthy or Burdine. Under the facts of this case, however, this Court found it unnecessary
to address this issue. Id. at 370.
44 NLRB v. Uloyd A. Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1981).
45 644 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1981). In Statler, the employer's justifications for discharge were
weak, and the General Counsel's prima facie case was strong and not rebutted by substantial
proof. After the Slatler decision, various circuits claimed that the First Circuit had accepted
the shifting burden of proof test of Wright Line. This contention, however, is not necessarily
true, for the Statler decision could be interpreted as accepting only the Board's replacement of
its "in part" test with the Supreme Court test in Mt. Healthy. The First Circuit did not men-
tion, let alone sanction, the Board's interpretation of M. Healthy requiring the employer to
carry the burden of persuasion.
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Divizon of Wright Line, Inc. .46 The court held that once the General
Counsel has made a prima facie showing that the protected conduct
was a motivating or substantial factor in the decision to discharge the
employee, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate the dis-
charge would have resulted even in the absence of the union activ-
ity.47 This burden, however, is merely the burden of going forward
to meet a prima facie case, not the burden of persuasion on the ulti-
mate issue of liability.48 The latter burden rests exclusively with the
General Counsel.
49
The First Circuit did accept the Board's adoption of the "but
for" test to determine whether union activity caused the discharge.
The court noted that its panel had, in fact, used this test since the Mt.
Healthy decision. 50 The court likewise accepted the Board's position
that some type of burden faces the employer once a prima facie
8(a) (3) violation is presented. 51 Unlike the Board, however, the court
could not shift the entire burden of proof to the employer. 52 Rather,
the court shifted to the employer only the burden of rebutting the
prima facie case.
53
The court cited section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act,54 the Board's regulation 101.10(b), 55 Professor Wigmore,56 rule
46 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). In Wright Line, employee Lamoureux, a Teamster ac-
tivist, was discharged from Wright Line for submitting inaccurate records of the times at
which he performed inspections. Id. at 900. The Board ordered Wright Line to reinstate
Lamoureux with back pay. Id. The First Circuit, although modifying the Board's burden of
proof standard, id. at 904-07, agreed that the employer was discharged in violation of
§ 8(a)(3), and granted the petition for enforcement of the order accordingly. Id. at 904. See
note 1 supra.
47 662 F.2d at 904, 905.
48 Id.
49 Before Wright Line, the Board ordered reinstatement whenever it concluded the dis-
charge was motivated by anti-union sentiments. The court noted that the Board's Wright Line
test improved upon its earlier practice. 662 F.2d at 904.
50 Cf Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Eastern Smelt-
ing & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979); Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB,
550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977). "The existence of anti-union 'discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment' [the language of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)] was most accurately deter-
mined by asking whether the discharge would have occurred 'but-for' the protected activity."
662 F.2d at 903.
51 The court admitted to approving "the general causation analysis in the Board's Wright
Line opinion" in its Statler Indus. decision. 662 F.2d at 904.
52 "We think the only burden which may be accepted on the employer is a 'burden of
production,' that is a burden of coming forward with credible evidence to rebut or meet the
general counsel's prima facie case." 662 F.2d at 904.
53 The employer has "[a] burden of going forward to meet a prima facie case, not a
burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of the existence of a violation." Id. at 905.
54 The National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) provides in part:
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301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,5 7 and the Supreme Court Title
VII discrimination holdings58 as convincing authority for its refusal
to shift the burden of proof to the employer.
The First Circuit recently had the opportunity to reconsider its
Wrzght Line position in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.)9
The court emphatically declined this opportunity, stating that while
it could support the Board's requirement that the employer meet the
prima facie test, it could not shift a heavier burden. 60 In refusing to
transfer the burden of proof to the employer, the court noted that it
had repeatedly rejected the Board's attempts to require a greater
burden, 61 as beyond the Board's "statutory authority. '6 2 In remand-
ing for reconsideration, the court ignored recent criticism of its Wright
Line decision.6
3
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the
opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall
issue an order dismissing the said complaint.
55 See note 14 supra. The court emphatically stated, "Section 10(c), as well as the Board's
own regulation [29 C.F.R. § 101.10(b)], make clear that the general counsel must prove the
employer's guilt by a preponderance of the evidence ... " 662 F.2d at 904.
56 Professor Wigmore asserts:
[A] prima facie case need not be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence,
or by evidence of a greater weight; but the evidence needs only to be balanced, put
in equipoise, by some evidence worthy of credence; and if this be done, the burden
of the evidence is met and the duty to producing further evidence shifts back to the
party having the burden of proof, . . ."
9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
57 The court stated:
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence very aptly describes the scope of the
duty involved in rebutting presumptions in civil cases as 'the burden of going for-
ward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption,' and distinguishes this duty
from 'the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.'
662 F.2d at 905; see FED. R. Evio. 301.
58 The court cited Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
which held the burden of persuasion on the issue of discriminatory intent in Title VII cases
always remains with the plaintiff. 662 F.2d at 907. See note 75 infia.
59 674 F.2d 130 (Ist Cir. 1982). In this case, decided April 1, 1982, the Board found a
§ 8(a)(3) violation because the company "failed to meet its burden of overcoming the General
Counsel'sprimafacie case. . . ." Id. at 131. (emphasis in original).
60 Id.
61 NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981) (explicit rejection); NLRB v. Am-
ber Delivery Service, Inc., 651 F.2d 57, 69 (1st Cir. 1981) (implicit rejection); NLRB v.
Cablevision, 660 F.2d 1, 8 (lst Cir. 1981) (implicit rejection); NLRB v. Eastern Smelting &
Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 66, 67 n.12 (1st Cir. 1977) (implicit rejection).
62 674 F.2d at 131.
63 Remar, Climbing Aft. Healthy: In Search of the "Wrght-Line" on Mixed-Motive Discharges
Under Section 8(a)('3), 4 INDUs. LJ. 636 (1981). Remar believes, "[T]he First Circuit's reli-
ance on interpretation of section 10(c) and the Board's own regulations is unpersuasive. .. ,"
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C. The Third Circuit
In another recent decision, the Third Circuit confronted the
Wn'ght Line burden of proof issue. In Behring International Inc. v.
NLRB,64 the court accepted and elaborated upon the views of the
First Circuit. In a well-reasoned opinion, the court held the Board in
error for shifting the burden of proof to the employer.65 The court
held that once the Company articulated a legitimate business reason
for the discharge, the General Counsel should have been required to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Company's real
motive was anti-union animus.
66
The court initially noticed that the Wrzght Line test includes
both substantive and procedural components, which operate in con-
flict with each other.67 The substantive, but-for component was
characterized as "[a] welcome development which should reduce the
confusion in this controversial area of labor law."' 68 The procedural,
Mt. Healthy, shifting burden of proof component was rejected, how-
ever, because "[t]he Board is bound by statutory [and regulatory]
limitations which foreclose the issue."' 69 The court aptly observed
and "the court's conclusion is simply inconsistent with M. Healthy" because the First Circuit
misunderstands "the nature of a prima facie case." Id. at 677-78. Philip C. Lederer, in his
article "W"right Line or Spur Track?, 33 LABOR LJ. 67 (1982) disagrees. He concluded the
First Circuit's Wright Line decision was correct in its application of Title VII burden-placing
rationale. Id. at 80.
64 675 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1982).
65 Id. at 90.
66 Behring submitted an economic rationale, urging it layed off employees of the ware-
house and subcontracted their work because of a severe decline in business. Id. at 85.
67 The Board could rule a section 8(a)(3) violation was proved when it had never deter-
mined which of two causes, one legitimate and one illegal, with neither outweighing the
other, was the "real" cause prompting the discharge. General Counsel was required to prove
only that antiunion animus was "a" motivating factor, not "the" motivating factor. "As
such, the procedural aspect of the rule is plainly at odds with the 'but for' test." 675 F.2d at
88.
68 Id. at 87. The "but for" test satisfied the Third Circuit's mandate that the Board seek
the "real motive" or "real cause" of a discharge. For example, in Edgewood Nursing Center,
Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1978), the court held:
[I]f the employee would have been fired for cause irrespective of the employer's
attitude toward the union, the real reason is nondiscriminatory. In that circum-
stance there is no causal connection of any anti-union bias and the loss of the job.
Id. at 368. See also, NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1981); Gould
Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
69 "Mi. Healthy is inapposite in its burden-shifting phase, however, because the Board is
bound by statutory limitations which foreclose the issue." 675 F.2d at 88. These statutory
and regulatory limitations include § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 101.10(b) (1981); and § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976). § 7(c) reads, "[E]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the propo-
nent of a rule of order has the burden of proof."
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that there were no such limitations restraining the Supreme Court in
Mt. Healthy.70  There, the Court could freely shift the burden of
proof. But because of the restrictions, the Board has no authority to
transfer the burden to the employer.71 The Third Circuit thus re-
jected the Wright Line test.
The court did find "more appropriate precedent"' 72 in recent
Supreme Court decisions regarding the burden of proof in Title VII
employment discrimination cases. 73 In these cases, the Supreme
Court left no doubt that the plaintiff always has the ultimate burden
of proving discrimination. 74 The defendant need only present some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The burden re-
mains on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the reasons proffered by the defendant were not its "real"
reasons.
75
In summary, the court noted that anti-union discrimination is
substantially similar to discrimination caused by race, religion, and
nationality biases.76 The Supreme Court recognized proof problems
in its Burdine line of holdings, and decided that only the burden of
production, not persuasion, shifts to the defendant. 77 Given the simi-
larity between Title VII and anti-union discrimination, the Board
should follow the Burdine procedure as well. 78 The Third Circuit
joined the First Circuit in challenging the Board's shifting burden of
70 675 F.2d at 88.
71 Id. The court stated: "Since none of these statutory or regulatory provisions were
applicable in M. Healthy, the Supreme Court was free to allocate the burden of proof. The
Board, on the other hand, has no power to shift that burden onto the employer." Id.
72 Id.
73 Cf. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); and Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
74 675 F.2d at 88.
75 Id. at 88, 89. The Burdine court stated: "In a Title VII case, the allocation of burdens
and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended
progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimi-
nation." 450 U.S. at 255 n.8. The Third Circuit repeated this Supreme Court language, then
added: "Since the employer presumably is most likely to be in possession of evidence showing
the real reason for its action, it must produce that evidence to rebut plaintiff'sp'nafacie
showing of discrimination. Nevertheless, the ultimate burden of proof remains on the dis-
criminatee." 675 F.2d at 89 n.4.
The Third Circuit also applied the Burdize logic in a Title VII context, in NAACP v.
Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981).
76 675 F.2d at 89.
77 Id.
78 The Third Circuit reaffirmed Behring in NLRB v. Blackstone Co., No. 81-3132, slip op.
(3d Cir. Aug. 11, 1982). The court remanded the case when it concluded the ALJ applied an
improper Wright Line burden of proof, stating:
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proof test. 79
The Third Circuit's Behr'ng decision thoroughly and intelli-
gently analyzes the burden of proof dilemma currently dividing the
United States Courts of Appeal. The Supreme Court's Title VII
holdings are indeed excellent precedent to govern mixed-motive dis-
charge cases because similar types of discrimination -characterize
each. In contrast, the M. Healthy decision involved the discharge of
an employee for asserting a constitutional right.80 The Behring deci-
sion, because of its complete discussion of the problem and use of
sound logic in reaching a solution, is likely to be influential among
the circuits. By applying the Behring rationale, circuit courts should
be able to reach fair results in dual motive cases.
IV. Conclusion
The Board's decision in Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc.
represented a marked departure from its previous decisions in dual
motive cases. In an attempt to clarify a confusing area of the law,
and to meet the mounting criticism over its "in part" test, the Board
adopted the shifting burden of proof test enunciated in Mt. Healthy
School District Board of Education v. Doyle. Unfortunately, the Board
The ultimate burden of proof does not shift from the General Counsel and
does not devolve upon the employer at any stage. Therefore, no violation may be
found unless the Board determines that the General Counsel has proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the employer's antiunion animus was the real
cause of the discharge.
No. 81-3132, slip op. at 7 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 1982).
79 The court stated, "We agree with the First Circuit, and believe that the Board failed to
take into account the General Counsel's statutory burden to prove the unfair labor practice."
675 F.2d at 89.
The Board, before both the First and Third Circuits, relied on NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailors, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), where the employer discriminated between strikers and
nonstrikers with respect to vacation pay. The Supreme Court said: "Once it has been proved
that the employers engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected
employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was
motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him." Id. at
34.
Both circuits distinguished Great Dane because it involved "a challenge to an overall pol-
icy of an employer rather than to a single discharge." 662 F.2d at 904 n.8; 675 F.2d at 89.
Additionally, Great Dane was not primarily concerned "with the difference between the bur-
den of production and the burden of persuasion, and terms applicable to both are used some-
what interchangeably throughout the opinion." 675 F.2d at 89. Notably lacking in the Great
Dane opinion is "the precision the Court later applied in Burdine when it addressed the spe-
cific issues of the burdens of production and persuasion." Id
80 In Mt. Healthy, untenured teacher Doyle alleged the Mt. Healthy School Board refused
to renew his contract in violation of his rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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succeeded neither in clarifying the issue nor in overcoming the criti-
cism of its standard of proof.
The reaction of the circuits to the Board's decision has been di-
verse. While some courts have adopted the Wright Line rule, others
have rejected it, and still others are unsure of their position on the
issue. Moreover, few circuits have attempted to analyze the Board's
Wrght Line decision.
In those courts where Wright Line has been meticulously ana-
lyzed, it has been rejected as being contrary to the Federal Rules of
Evidence and to the Board's own rules. Thus, both the First and the
Third Circuits, after carefully considering the Board's Wright Line
rule, discarded that rule and adopted instead a shifting burden of
production test. This test places the burden of persuasion on the em-
ployee and only a burden of production on the employer.
Regardless of which test is adopted, however, the need for uni-
formity is evident. The circuits are split in their decisions on this
issue, and several courts are confused as to the state of the law within
their own circuit. Moreover, the Board's attempt to achieve this uni-
formity through its Wright Line decision has only added to the
confusion.
It is vitally important that the Supreme Court grant certiorari to
decide this issue in Pettibone Corp. v. NLRB.81 While at this point
there is no definite indication of which way the Court will decide in
Pettibone, the finality of the Court's decision, and the clarity which it
will bring to this area of the law, will undoubtedly benefit all of the
circuits. Ultimately, only clarity and uniformity will insure that the





81 Set note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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Insider Trading-THE EXTENSION OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
MATERIAL INSIDE INFORMATION
The duty to disclose material inside information when trading
in securities, or refrain from trading (disclose-or-refrain duty/rule), is
based on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5. 1
The rule does not, however, explicitly prohibit trading on inside in-
formation. Rather, the disclose-or-refrain duty results from judicial
construction of the general antifraud provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC rule 10b-5.
2
I Rule l0b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
2 Rule 10b-5 is an SEC regulation. It is based on two statutory provisions: § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 17(a) is
a general antifraud provision. It states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to promulgate regulations. It
states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, . ..
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
RECENT DECISIONS
The early cases based the duty to disclose on the ideal of informa-
tional parity among all traders.3 These cases left the way open for a
broad extension of the rule. The Supreme Court limited this exten-
sion in Chiarella v. United States.4 Chiarella based the duty not on the
ideal of informational parity, but on a relationship of trust between
the parties to a transaction. 5 This piece discusses district and circuit
courts' expansion of the duty in three cases subsequent to Chiarella:
United States v. Newman ,6 O'Conner & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. ,7 and Dirks v. SEC.8
I. The Duty to Disclose or Refrain
A. The Early Development of the Duy Under Rule 10b-5
The disclose-or-refrain duty under rule lOb-5 originated in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co. 9 In this case, a stockbroker, while serving as a
director of a corporation, learned that it planned to reduce its divi-
dend.'0 The director informed his brokerage firm of the dividend
reduction, and the firm then sold some of its stock in the corporation
without disclosing the inside information to the purchasers." The
SEC, in suspending the broker, adopted an ideal of informational
parity in the marketplace. The SEC held that when a corporate "in-
sider," such as an officer, director, or controlling stockholder, trades
in securities on information obtained through his position, he must
disclose material information that is unavailable to the person with
whom he is dealing. If he does not disclose, then he must not trade.' 2
The SEC adopted the disclose-or-refrain rule for two reasons.
First, information obtained through a relationship intended for a cor-
porate purpose should not be used for anyone's personal benefit.' 3
Second, using information which is unavailable to others is inher-
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
3 See notes 9-34 infra and accompanying text.
4 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
5 Id. at 233. See notes 47-66 infra and accompanying text.
6 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
7 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
8 681 F.2d 824 (1982),pedtion for cert. fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1982) (No.
82-276).
9 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Prior to the modem securities regulations, see note 2 supra, the
common law developed the "special facts" doctrine to deal with insider trading. See note 24
infra .
10 40 S.E.C. at 909.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 911.
13 Id. at 912.
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ently unfair. 14
In Cady, Roberts, the SEC refused to limit rule 10b-5 to transac-
tions with stockholders. The insiders were held liable for selling stock
to purchasers in the general market. According to the SEC, the com-
mon law based the duty to disclose material inside information on
the relationship between corporate officials and stockholders. 15 But,
the SEC stated, the antifraud provisions in the securities regulations
are much broader and are intended to protect the investing public.16
Given this interpretation of Congress's intent, the SEC saw no reason
why purchasers in the general market should not expect the same
protection as stockholders.
17
The SEC saw a possible conflict between a stockbroker's duty to
protect the interests of his customers and his duty to disclose confi-
dential inside information to the market. 8 The SEC, however,
clearly placed the duty to the investing public above the duty to the
customer. ' 9
Cad,, Roberts held that a stockbroker owed to all purchasers a
duty to disclose material inside information obtained as a member of
a corporation's board of directors.20 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Corp. ,21 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
extended this duty to corporate officers and employees. 2 The court
held that corporate insiders could not profit at stockholders' expense
simply because the insiders possessed information not available to the
stockholders.23 It refrained from explicitly basing the duty either on
traditional fiduciary concepts or on the common law "special facts"
doctrine.24 It did state, however, that all investors trading in the
14 Id.
15 Id. at 913-14 n.15.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 913.
18 Id. at 916.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 917.
21 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
22 But unlike the broker in Cady, Roberts, the insiders at Texas Gulf Sulphur purchased
stock from stockholders. The court, therefore, did not have to decide whether officers and
employees, in addition to directors, owed a disclose-or-refrain duty to purchasers in the mar-
ketplace.
The facts of the case are as follows. Texas Gulf Sulphur was exploring for minerals in
Canada. A corporation press release played down rumors that it made a great find. But
insiders possessed more reliable information than the public and purchased stock without
informing the stockholders. The corporation discovered the minerals and publicized the find.
The price of its stock rose dramatically and the insiders reaped a large profit. d. at 839-43.
23 Id. at 848.
24 Id. The court cited Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), as an example of the "spe-
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marketplace should have "relatively equal access to material infor-
mation. ' 25 This reasoning, in effect, extended the duty beyond those
in confidential relationships with a corporation to anyone possessing
material inside information.
26
In Shapiro v. Memill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,27 the Sec-
ond Circuit further extended the disclose-or-refrain duty. The court
held that brokers acquiring inside information through work on a
securities issue, and the outside parties tipped by the brokers, were all
liable to purchasers in the marketplace. 28 Furthermore, the court
held the brokers liable even though they did not trade their own se-
curities but simply informed third parties who did trade.
29
cial facts" doctrine. In Strong, the doctrine supported a director's duty to disclose inside infor-
mation to a stockholder. According to the Supreme Court, the relationship between a
director and a stockholder is not a traditional fiduciary relationship and cannot alone support
a duty to disclose. But when the director knows "special facts" he must disclose them before
trading with the stockholder. The court did not define "special facts" but simply discussed
the facts peculiar to Strong.
Later decisions have referred to the relationship between corporate insiders and stock-
holders as a fiduciary relationship. Thus the Chiarella Court announced in a footnote that
"[t]he decision in Strong v. Repide was premised upon the fiduciary duty between the corporate
insider and the shareholder." 445 U.S. at 228 n.10 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307
(1939)). In the body of the opinion, however, the Chiarella Court spoke instead of a duty to
disclose growing out of a "relationship of trust and confidence." 445 U.S. at 230. The Court
presumably meant to include some non-fiduciary as well as fiduciary sources for the duty, but
it did not elaborate on the relationships giving rise to one kind of duty or the other. See note
56 in/a and accompanying text. The District Court for the Southern District of New York,
also citing Pepper, asserted that "[c]orporate officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders to administer their duties for the common good of all the
shareholders." O'Conner & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. at 1182-
83. See notes 79-87 infa and accompanying text.
For the purposes of the present discussion, it is largely a question of terminology whether
to label the relationship between a corporate insider and a shareholder a "fiduciary relation-
ship" or a "relationship of trust and confidence." No matter what the label, the law is settled
that such a relationship gives rise to a duty to the stockholder to disclose material nonpublic
information before trading. See notes 39-42 in/a and accompanying text. To follow the deci-
sions interpreting rule lOb-5, it is important to recognize that different courts may use differ-
ent terminology without necessarily intending a different theoretical foundation. Thus when
the O'Conner court used the term "fiduciary duty," it did not mean to contrast fiduciary duty
with the Chiarella concept of duty arising from a "relationship of trust and confidence." See
notes 82, 86, and 87 in/a and accompanying text.
25 401 F.2d at 848.
26 The court's language in Texas Gulf Sulphur clearly extended the duty to all persons
having inside information: "Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public, or. . . must abstain from trading ... " Id. at 848
(emphasis added).
27 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
28 Id. at 237-38.
29 Shapiro v. MAeill Lynch involved a motion to dismiss a complaint based on rule lOb-5
for failure to state a cause of action. Douglas Aircraft Corporation hired Merrill Lynch as the
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The court began by saying that the purpose of the securities
laws was to protect the investing public by promoting a fully in-
formed investment decision through disclosure of inside informa-
tion. 30 Citing Texas Gu(/ Sulphur, the court said that anyone in
possession of material inside information must disclose it to the pub-
lic or refrain from trading.3t The court also found the "tippees," who
had no confidential relationship with the corporation, liable for vio-
lating the disclose-or-refrain rule.32 Tippees could violate the rule if
they acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the informa-
tion was nonp'ublic. 33 If the tippees chose not to disclose the informa-
tion, then they were bound to refrain from trading.
34
B. Theoretical Bases of the Duy." The Fiduciay Theory
and the Information Theogy
The disclose-or-refrain duty requires a person trading in securi-
ties to disclose any material35 inside36 information, or refrain from
trading. Early case law did not make clear, however, the circum-
managing underwriter for a large issue of debentures. During the course of this work, Merrill
Lynch learned that Douglas Corporation's earnings had taken a sharp drop from what Doug-
las Corporation anticipated. Before Douglas published this information, Merrill Lynch in-
formed some of its clients who sold their Douglas stock to uninformed purchasers. After these
sales the price of Douglas's stock dropped. Five individual purchasers brought a class action
on behalf of themselves and all others who had purchased stock during the period the infor-
mation remained undisclosed. They sued both Merrill Lynch and Merrill Lynch's "tippees."
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court denied the motion.
The Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 231-34.
30 Id. at 235.
31 Id. at 236.
32 Id. at 237.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Material information is information that a reasonable investor would consider impor-
tant in making his decision to buy or sell. In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976), the Supreme Court dealt with false or misleading proxy statements under SEC rule
14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975), and addressed the issue of materiality: "An omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote." 426 U.S. at 449. Other cases have discussed materiality
in terms of an investor's reliance on a representation or omission. Compare List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (requiring reliance
in order to establish liability under rule 10b-5); with Cohen v. Franchord Corp., 478 F.2d 115,
124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973) (questioning the need for reliance); and Jackson
v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 667-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modifed, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir.
1976) (also questioning the need for reliance).
36 Inside information is information unavailable to an outside investor. Information that
an investor should reasonably be aware of need not be disclosed. See Seibert v. Sperry Rand




stances under which an investor who possesses material inside infor-
mation owes this duty. Judge Wright, in Dirks v. SEC,37 stated that
the decisions creating and extending the duty did not clearly describe
these circumstances. However, he identified two theories which ap-
pear in the cases: 1) the "fiduciary" theory, and 2) the "information"
theory.
38
The fiduciary theory protects the relationship of trust between
an insider and a corporation. 39 The insider has an interest in his own
profit and loss, but he must also protect the stockholders' interests.
When these interests conflict, this theory places the stockholders' in-
terests above the insider's own interests. 40 If the insider uses informa-
tion intended for the stockholders' benefit to the stockholders'
detriment, he has breached this trust and committed a fraud. The
law protects the relationship between the insider and the stockholder
by requiring the insider to disclose nonpublic information to the
stockholder before trading. To protect this trust, the courts have ex-
tended the duty to tippees because their trading would, in effect, vio-
late the trust between the corporate insiders and the stockholders.
4
1
Insiders also have a duty to purchasers in the market since the pur-
chasers, as future stockholders, would also rely on corporate insiders
to protect their interests.
42
The information theory protects investors who have no access to
37 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982),pelition for cer. fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Aug. 17,
1982) (No. 82-276).
38 Id. at 834-35.
39 The relationship of trust need not be a fiduciary relationship. The class of relation-
ships of trust, where one party has a duty to disclose, is more inclusive than the class of
fiduciary relationships. The common law recognized this distinction and imposed the duty to
disclose in three different situations: 1) in a fiduciary relationship, 2) in a non-fiduciary rela-
tionship where one party expressly puts his trust in another, and 3) in a contract which neces-
sarily requires good faith and full disclosure but which falls in neither the first or second class.
See 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 902 (5th ed. 1941). The law concerning fiduci-
ary relationships was relatively clear. On the other hand, the law concerning non-fiduciary
relationships which required disclosure was not as clear. Pomeroy said: "The nature of the
transaction is not the test in this class. Each case must depend on its own circumstances." Id.
Thus the courts promulgated no clear principles but made ad hoc determinations of liability.
Modern securities law inherits this difficulty. For example, Judge Wright did not clearly
define the limits of non-fiduciary relationships which require disclosure. Dirks v. SEC, 681
F.2d at 839 (paraphrasing Justice Cardozo in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
591 (1937)) ("With respect to imposition of the disclose-or-refrain rule where fiduciary obliga-
tions are not violated, we do not fix the outermost line. Wherever the line may be, this case is
within it."). See also notes 56, 120, and 121 infra and accompanying text.
40 See In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 916.
41 See note 58 injfa and accompanying text. See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d
at 237.
42 See text accompanying note 60 infra.
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inside information. According to this theory, an investor who pos-
sesses inside information should not benefit at the expense of others
who do not have access to nonpublic information. 43 The ideal situa-
tion is informational parity: all investors should have equal access to
material investment information. 44 When information is available to
all investors, no disclosure is necessary. 45 But when an outside inves-
tor is unable to discover the information through his own efforts, the
law should protect him by requiring the person who possesses inside
information to disclose it. Investors entering the market should have
the government's assurance that they will not suffer a loss because
another investor takes advantage of information which is not avail-
able to the general public.
46
The theory chosen determines the extent of the duty. A court
choosing the fiduciary theory will extend the duty only to traders in a
relationship of trust with the corporation. A person outside this rela-
tionship, but who possesses inside information, can thus trade freely.
A court choosing the information theory will prohibit the same per-
son from trading without disclosing. The duty will extend to all
traders with inside information whether or not they have a relation-
ship of trust with the corporation.
C. Chiarella v. United States: Supreme Court Guidance on
the Reach of Rule lOb-5
Supreme Court securities decisions since 1974 have consistently
refused to expand the scope of rule 10b-5. 4 7 The Court continued to
interpret rule 10b-5 narrowly when it addressed theories of liability
43 The SEC in Cady, Roberts said the use of inside information unavailable to others was
"inherently unfair." 40 S.E.C. at 912.
44 For a discussion of the practicality of this approach, see Herman, Equil Fundi'ng, Inside
Infonnation, and the Regulators, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1, 17-28 (1973) (stating that the market is so
full of arbitrary advantage that an investor cannot expect equality of information).
45 See note 36 supra.
46 See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 353-67 (1979) (arguing that the policy behind the antifraud
provisions is similiar to the information theory).
47 See Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (Securities Act and Securities Exchange
Act do not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan, and therefore alleged fraud
in connection with sale of interests does not violate § 10(b) or rule lOb-5); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (short form Delaware merger with subsequent disclosure to
shareholders was neither deceptive nor manipulative, and therefore did not violate § 10(b) or
rule lOb-5 despite alleged undervaluation of minority stockholders' shares); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 requires allegation of scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (proper plaintiffs in civil suit under § 10(b) and rule 10(b)-5 limited to purchasers and
sellers of stock, and do not include persons who refrained from purchasing because of misrep-
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for nondisclosure in Chiarella v. United States.48
Chiarella worked for a financial printer which printed tender
offer documents for certain companies planning takeover bids. The
acquiring and target companies' names were left blank until the final
printing. On five occasions, however, Chiarella deduced the identi-
ties of the target companies, bought target stock before the public
announcements, and sold the stock for large profits after the an-
nouncements of the takeover attempts. The government brought a
criminal action, and the district court convicted Chiarella of violat-
ing section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule
10b-5.49
In affirming the district court, the Second Circuit suggested that
a workable test of whether one had a duty to disclose or refrain
would be whether he had regular access to material nonpublic infor-
mation.50 This test, it suggested, would make the disclose-or-refrain
rule applicable to "those who occupy. . . strategic places in the mar-
ket mechanism."15 1 The Second Circuit thus applied a modified form
of the information theory.
The Supreme Court reversed. 52 The Court explicitly rejected
the information theory, including the "regular access to market infor-
mation" test proposed by the Second Circuit.53 It held that "a duty
to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information.
'54
resentation). See also I BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, SECURrTIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 2.2 (1981).
48 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
49 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
50 "Anyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic infor-
mation may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose, he must abstain from buying or selling." United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original).
51 588 F.2d at 1365-66, quoted in 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
52 445 U.S. at 225.
53 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
54 Id. at 235. The Court seemed to attach significance to the fact that Chiarella traded
on nonpublic market, as opposed to corporate, information. Corporate information is infor-
mation about a company's earning power or assets; market information is information about
other circumstances that affect the price of its securities, such as impending investment rec-
ommendations, tender offers, or stock splits. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial
Inquig into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 799 (1973).
The Court noted that the SEC limits but does not completely disallow trading on unequal
market information in other contexts, such as a tender offeror's purchase of target corporation
stock before publicly announcing the offer. The Court apparently found Chiarella's situation
analogous. 445 U.S. at 233. The holding in Chiarella might thus be limited to market infor-
mation situations. The Court's rationale in reversing Chiarella's conviction, however, was
that silence cannot act as fraud absent a duty to speak based on a relationship between buyer
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According to Chiarella, the crucial factor in previous decisions
finding a disclose-or-refrain duty was "a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction. ' 55 The Court, however,
did not provide any criteria for determining when a relationship of
trust and confidence exists. 56 Instead, it gave examples of relation-
ships which had been held in the past to give rise to a disclose-or-
refrain duty under rule 10b-5. One example the Court clearly en-
dorsed was the relationship of corporate insiders to stockholders.
57
The Court also appeared to endorse the view that tippees of corpo-
rate insiders have a duty to disclose or refrain from trading with
stockholders.58 In this situation, the relationship between transacting
parties is at best indirect. The Court left unclear whether the rela-
tionship creating the duty need exist prior to the transaction. It im-
plied that it must,59 but at least where corporate insiders are selling
stock to new purchasers, it indicated that the relationship created by
the transaction itself gives rise to a duty to disclose. 6° Thus, while the
Court emphasized that a 10b-5 duty to disclose arises from a relation-
ship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction, it did
not make explicit the circumstances giving rise to such a relationship,
and seller. Id. at 232. This rationale should not distinguish between market and other kinds
of information.
55 445 U.S. at 230.
56 The Court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (a) (1976) to the
effect that silence about facts material to a transaction constitutes fraud if one party has
information "that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them." 445 U.S. at 228. The Comment on this
section of the RESTATEMENT gives several examples of relations of trust and confidence, but
says that "[i]t is not within the scope of this Restatement to state the rules that determine the
duty of disclosure which under the law of business associations the directors of a company
owe to its shareholders." Ste note 39 supra.
57 445 U.S. at 230.
58 Id. at 230 n.12. Citing Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d at 237-38, the Court re-
ported that " '[t]ippees' of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) because they
have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider." The Court then observed that "[t]he
tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant after the fact in
the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty" (citing ABA4 Comment Letter on Material, Non-Public
Information, [Jan.-June] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 233, at D-1, D-2 (Oct. 15, 1973)). In
this situation, of course, the relationship between the tippee and stockholder exists only via
the relationship of each to a corporate insider. Since the Court cited without criticism the
position that such an attenuated relationship entails a disclose-or-refrain duty, one can as-
sume it agrees.
59 445 U.S. at 232. Thus in maintaining that Chiarella owed no duty to the sellers from
whom he purchased stock, the Court said that "[n]o duty could arise from petitioner's rela-
tionship with the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings
with them." Id.
60 Id. at 227 n.8 (citing Cady, Roberts).
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how attenuated the relationship might be, or when it must come into
existence in order to support a duty under rule lOb-5.
Finally, the Court left unclear whether a relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction is the only source of
a disclose-or-refrain duty under rule 10b-5. The Court did not reach
the government's principal argument in Chiarella,61 in which the gov-
ernment developed a new theory of 10b-5 liability: the "misappro-
priation" theory.62 Under this theory, Chiarella breached a duty to
the acquiring corporation by using information he obtained while
working for a printer employed by the corporation. His actions there-
fore constituted a "fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the sale" of any security."' 63 The Court explicitly declined to
"speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been
breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a violation of
§ 10(b)." 64 In not rejecting the government's rationale, however, the
Court implied that the misappropriation of information in connec-
tion with a securities transaction might be another source of 10b-5
liability.6
5
By focusing on the concept of duty, the Supreme Court in
Chiarella cut back significantly on the reach of rule 10b-5 as inter-
preted, at least in dicta, in earlier cases.66 According to Chiarella,
trading without disclosing material nonpublic information does not
violate rule 10b-5 absent a fiduciary or similar duty owed to the
other party to the transaction. A relationship of trust and confidence
gives rise to a disclose-or-refrain duty. The Court discussed a few
situations where a relationship of trust and confidence exists. How-
ever, it left to future litigation the question of how far beyond these
examples one might expand the sources of the disclose-or-refrain
duty, the class of persons owing the duty, and the class of persons to
whom it is owed.
61 The Court did not reach this argument because it was not adequately presented to the
jury. 445 U.S. at 236.
62 The theory was so labeled by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63 See note 1 supra.
64 445 U.S. at 236-37 (footnote omitted).
65 Thus the Chief Justice noted that the Court's opinion, as he read it, left open "the
question whether § 10(b) and rule lob-5 prohibit trading on misappropriated nonpublic in-
formation." Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The ChiefJustice in his dissent argued that
the misappropriation theory was both adequately presented to the jury and correct, though
he seemed to focus less on Chiarella's breach of duty as an employee than on the fact that he
"stole" the information. Id. at 243-45 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
66 See notes 14, 25, 26, 30, and 31 supra and accompanying text.
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II. Recent Decisions: The Re-expansion of 10b-5
Liability after Chiare/la
In three recent cases, United States v. Newman,67 O'Conner &Associ-
ales v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 68 and Dirks v. SEC,69 courts have
interpreted the concept of duty broadly so as to support 10b-5 liabil-
ity. These courts have viewed a relationship of trust and confidence
between the trader and some particular person as limiting acceptable
conduct by the trader toward all investors in the marketplace, even
those with whom he had no prior relationship. The Newman,
O'Conner, and Dirks courts collectively enunciate a theory of liability
almost as inclusive as the information theory rejected by Chiarella.
Under the new theory, however, persons who are both corporate out-
siders and outsiders to the securities industry70 have a duty to disclose
only "tainted" information. Tainted information is information ob-
tained through a breach of duty, either the duty of the person dis-
pensing the information, or the duty of the person obtaining it.
71
A. Newman and O'Conner: The Misappropriation Theog Applied
In Newman, investment bank employees passed on confidential
information about clients' merger and takeover bids to securities
traders. The securities traders purchased stock in the target compa-
nies before the mergers and sold it afterwards at a profit. The gov-
ernment indicted one of the bank employees on the misappropriation
theory advanced in Chiarella, and the securities traders on a theory of
aiding and abetting the misappropriation.
72
The Newman court noted that the Supreme Court in Chiarella
left the issue of the misappropriation theory "for another day."' 73 It
then explicitly undertook to decide the issue, stating that "[f]or this
Court, that day has now come."' 74 The court found that because the
bank employees' misappropriation involved both fraud 75 and a con-
67 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
68 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
69 681 F.2d 824,petition for cert.fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1982) (No. 82-276).
70 "Securities industry insider," as used in this discussion, includes registered stockbrokers
and their employees. "Securities industry outsider" means anyone who is not a securities
industry insider.
71 See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
72 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15-16.
73 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring), quoted in 664 F.2d at 16.
74 664 F.2d at 16.
75 "By sullying the reputations of Courtois' and Antoniu's employers as safe repositories
of client confidences, appellee and his cohorts defrauded those employers as surely as if they
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nection to a securities transaction 76 under rule 10b-5, it therefore vio-
lated the rule. That is, the conduct of Newman and his cohorts
violated rule 10b-5 even though they had no direct or indirect rela-
tionship of trust and confidence with the persons from whom they
bought stock. 77 A possible extension of this decision would be that
one owes a general duty to the marketplace not to trade on nonpub-
lic information obtained through a breach of duty.
78
This conclusion was drawn soon after by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York in O'Conner &Asso-
ciates v. Dean Witter Rnods, Inc. O'Conner, an options trading firm,
sued two corporations (in lieu of alleged unknown inside tippers)
79
and alleged first- and second-order tippees80 for trading in call op-
tions on inside tips.8 1 The court agreed with the defendants that cor-
porate insiders and their tippees owe no fiduciary duty82 to options
traders.83 However, it held that insiders and their tippees could still
be liable under rule lOb-5 to options traders.84 Citing Newman, it
took their money." 664 F.2d at 17. Courtois and Antoniu were the employees of the invest-
ment banking firms.
76 "[S]ince appellee's sole purpose in participating in the misappropriation of confiden-
tial takeover information was to purchase shares of the target companies, we find little merit
in his disavowal of a connection between the fraud and the purchase." Id. at 18.
77 "We hold that appellee's conduct as alleged in the indictment could be found to con-
stitute a criminal violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 despite the fact that neither [the
investment banking firms] nor their clients was at the time a purchaser or seller of the target
company securities in any transaction with any of the defendants." 664 F.2d at 16 (footnote
omitted).
78 See Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiducia Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement,
70 CAL. L. REv. 1, 49 (1982). The court did imply, however, that persons from whom New-
man purchased stock might not have standing to sue. Thus in upholding the -right of the
United States to bring the action, it noted that when the SEC or the United States Attorney
institutes litigation under rule lOb-5, "the court's concern must be with the scope of the Rule,
not plaintiff's standing to sue." 664 F.2d at 17.
79 The corporations sued were Amax, Inc. and Standard Oil Company of California (So-
cal). 529 F. Supp. at 1179.
80 The tippees sued were Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., A.G. Becker, Inc., and some of
their customers.
81 O'Conner alleged that registered representatives of Dean Witter Reynolds and Becker
had received inside information from unknown insiders at Amax or Socal regarding a Socal
bid to take over Amax. These representatives and their customers then allegedly purchased
call options on Amax stock at the same time that O'Conner was selling its options. Several of
the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under either
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act or § 14 of the Williams Act. They argued that the
complaint did not state a claim because it did not allege any fiduciary duty between them-
selves and O'Conner. 529 F. Supp. at 1182-83.
82 For the O'Conner court's use of the term "fiduciary," see note 24 supra.
83 529 F. Supp. at 1184-85.
84 Id. at 1185.
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said that a breach of fiduciary duty owed to any party 5 constitutes a
fraudulent practice under rule lOb-5.86 More significantly, it held
that O'Conner had standing to sue for breach of a derivative duty
which corporate insiders and their tippees owe to the marketplace:
[B]y virtue of theirfiduciao, duty to the corporation and its share-
holders, corporate insiders become subject to the separate duty to
either 'abstain or disclose.' Unlike the fiduciary duty, which is
owed only to the corporation and its shareholders, this additional
duty to disclose is owed 'to the investing public,' . . . 'to those in-
vestors trading contemporaneously with the insider. .. '
Thus, by virtue of the corporate insiders' duties to the corpora-
tion, they, and by derivation their tippees, indirectly came under a
duty to O'Conner to 'abstain or disclose' if they possessed material
nonpublic information. Under traditional tort principles, O'Conner
has standing to sue for injuries resulting from the alleged breach of
this duty to it.87
From O'Conner and Newman the general principle emerges that
two categories of persons owe a disclose-or-refrain duty to the invest-
ing public at large: 1) corporate insiders, and 2) corporate outsiders
who possess tainted inside information. 88 Inside information held by
outsiders is tainted if obtained by a breach of an insider's duty, as
85 In this case, the duty breached was the duty of the Amax or Socal insiders to their
respective corporations and the corporations' stockholders.
86 Just as the insiders owed no fiduciary duty to the persons with whom they traded in
Newman, the insiders here may have owed no fiduciary duty to the writers of call
options. Nevertheless, under the Newman rationale, because their trading or tipping
breached fiduciary duties owed to other parties, the alleged conduct constituted a
fraudulent practice within the meaning of the securities laws.
529 F. Supp. at 1185.
87 Id. at 1187 (emphasis in original) (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d at 240,
and Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 1981)). Wilson
held that an insider owes a disclose-or-refrain duty only to those investors trading contempo-
raneously with the insider. The court denied the plaintiff standing to sue because he had
purchased stock a month after the insider's trading, even though no disclosure had ever been
made.
88 Under this formulation of the principle, Chiarella and Newman could be held liable to
the stockholders from whom they purchased stock without disclosing. One might argue that
this is too broad a reading of O'Conner. The O'Conner court seemed to attach some importance
to the fact that "[i]n the present case, in contrast to Chiarella, it is alleged that corporate
insiders were the source of the material, inside information." 529 F. Supp. at 1187. On the
other hand, the O'Conner court referred to the conduct of Newman and his associates as consti-
tuting "a breach offducia, duties owed to the tippers' employers, their employers' clients,
and their stockholders." Id. at 1185 (emphasis added). One can assume, then, that it also
would view Chiarella's behavior as violating a "fiduciary" duty. Unless the court intended a
crucial distinction between various sorts of duties it labeled "fiduciary," Chiarella's duty to
his employer, and Newman's informants' duty to their employers, should also create a sepa-
rate disclose-or-refrain duty to the marketplace. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
Though the precise question was not addressed by the O'Conner court, this conclusion is con-
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with the tippees in O'Conner, or if obtained by a breach of one's own
duty, as in Newman.89 This principle emerging from Newman and
O'Conner retains Chiarella's emphasis on duty. However, it expands
both the sources of the duty90 and the class of persons to whom it is
owed.91
B. Dirks v. SEC: An Expanded Duy
to the Public and the SEC
In Dirks v. SEC,92 the D.C. Circuit used an analysis similar to
that of Newman and O'Conner, but extended the disclose-or-refrain
duty even further. It enunciated two grounds upon which it held
Dirks liable for violating rule 10b-5. It first said, in effect, that
Dirks's information was tainted, even though it was obtained without
a breach of fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty by anyone. It then said
that because Dirks worked for a registered broker, he owed a non-
fiduciary duty to the entire investing public to disclose or refrain. It
thus created a new category of person with duties similar to those of
the corporate insider: the securities industry insider.
93
Raymond L. Dirks was a securities analyst who, with the help of
leads given him by former employees of Equity Funding Corporation
of America (EFCA) and its subsidiaries, uncovered "one of the most
infamous frauds in recent memory." 94 Before revealing his discover-
ies to the SEC, Dirks informed several of his firm's institutional cli-
ents, who then sold their EFCA stock.95 On appeal from two SEC
sistent with its reasoning, especially in view of its heavy reliance on Newman. See note 86
Tupra.
89 As a practical matter, nearly all inside information in the hands of corporate outsiders
will be tainted. This is especially true if the concept of "taint" is expanded to include infor-
mation obtained legitimately from an insider but used for trading in a way forbidden to the
insider. This is the situation presented in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch. See text accompanying
notes 19 and 23 supra. See also notes 113-21 infra and accompanying text (discussing the Dirks
"constructive breach" theory).
90 The only source of a lOb-5 duty approved in Chiarella was a "relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction." See notes 55-65 supra and accompanying text.
Newman stands for the proposition that the misappropriation of information in connection
with a securities transaction also creates a duty to disclose or refrain. See note 77 supra.
91 Under Chiarella, a trader owes a lob-5 duty only to those with whom he has a "rela-
tionship of trust and confidence." See notes 55-65 supra and accompanying.text. Under
O'Conner, a fiduciary duty owed to anyone entails a disclose-or-refrain duty to the entire in-
vesting public. Set note 87 supra and accompanying text.
92 681 F.2d 824,petilionfor cerl.fled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1982) (No. 82-276).
93 See note 70 supra.
94 681 F.2d at 829.
95 Id. at 831. During Dirks's two-week investigation, he tried unsuccessfully to persuade
a reporter from the Wall Street Journal to publish an expose of EFCA. The Wall Street
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hearings, 96 the D.C. Circuit upheld a censure of Dirks for violating
rule 10b-5. 97
The court declined to rest its opinion on the argument raised by
the SEC below that Dirks had benefitted from his possession of non-
public corporate information.98 While the court discussed the misap-
propriation theory raised by the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan
and Blackmun in Chiarella,99 it did not conclude that Dirks had mis-
appropriated the information concerning EFCA. Instead, the court
reasoned that Dirks had violated rule 10b-5 by committing a con-
structive breachi° ° of a non-fiduciary duty.10 ' Alternatively, it held
that Dirks had an obligation to the SEC and the public which he
breached by passing his legally obtained information to his firm's cli-
ents before making it known to the SEC.
102
Sketching in the analytical grounds underlying rule 10b-5, the
court in Dirks noted the two theories on which the duty to disclose or
refrain historically had been found to rest: 1) a breach of a "tradi-
tional fiduciary relationship. . . or similar relationship of trust," and
Journal published its first story on the scandal, "based largely on information assembled by
Dirks," only the day after the SEC brought a complaint against EFCA. The reporter who
covered the story was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize. Id. at 831-32.
96 Boston Co. Institutional Investors, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 81,705 (Sept. 1, 1978); and Raymond L. Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,812 (Jan. 22, 1981).
Far from being hailed as a guardian of the securities marketplace, Dirks and five of his
firm's clients were brought before the SEC for a hearing. The administrative law judge in the
Boston Co. hearing found that the companies had violated rule lOb-5 by using nonpublic,
inside information without disclosing it to the purchasers to whom they sold their EFCA
stock. He found Dirks liable as an aider and abettor. The five institutional investors were
censured, and Dirks was suspended for sixty days from association with registered securities
dealers. Boston Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 81,705, at 80,865-67.
Both Dirks and the Division of Enforcement of the SEC appealed the initial decision. In
a second hearing, the Commission upheld the administrative law judge's theory of Dirks's
liability as an aider and abettor of tippees who had traded on inside information. In order
not to discourage other securities analysts from investigating corporations and following up
suggestions of fraud, and in light of Dirks's "otherwise unblemished twenty year record in the
securities industry," the Commission reduced his penalty from suspension to censure. Ray-
mond L. Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,812, at 83,950.
97 681 F.2d at 829. The court also upheld the SEC's interpretation of rule lOb-5 and
affirmed its reduction of Dirks's penalty. See note 96 supra.
98 681 F.2d at 834. See Raymond L. Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 82,812, at 83,948.
99 681 F.2d at 835-36. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
100 The term constructive breach is not used by the Dirks court. See Langevoort, supra
note 78.
101 681 F.2d at 839.
102 Id. at 841.
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2) a duty "based on the nature of the undisclosed information."1 0 3
Dirks attempted to show that his actions did not render him liable
under either theory. He argued first that his three primary infor-
mants, all former employees of EFCA or a subsidiary, did not breach
any duty cognizable under state law when they told him that they
suspected the company of committing fraud. 104 The court adopted
this view,105 which undercuts the first of the two rationales advanced
in previous cases for extending rule 10b-5 to persons trading on insid-
ers' tips:10 6 Dirks did not participate in any breach of a fiduciary or
similar duty.
Second, liability based on the misappropriation theory10 7 could
not be sustained on the unusual facts of this case. Dirks argued that
the informants had no legal duty under state law to keep information
about corporate fraud confidential, 0 so he could not be found to
have misappropriated the information he obtained from EFCA's
present and former employees. The court did not dispute this
argument. 0 9
Unable to sustain Dirks's censure on either the fiduciary or the
misappropriation theory, the court looked to Chiarella to fashion a
modification of the fiduciary theory broad enough to encompass the
facts before it. Focusing on the majority opinion in Chiarella"0 and
lower court cases, II the Dirks court argued that neither the Supreme
Court nor the circuits intended to limit rule 10b-5 to the states' stan-
dards of fiduciary responsibility." 12 That is, an actual prior breach of
fiduciary duty punishable under state law was not needed to trigger
the disclose-or-refrain mandate of rule 10b-5."13 The court declined
to interpret Shapiro v. MellLynch"4 and Chiare/la as requiring "that
103 Id. at 835.
104 Id. at 838.
105 Id. Dirks argued that his informants had not violated any state law when they told
him what they knew about fraud at EFCA. The court did not appear to be convinced that
the informants had "no duty under California law to maintain confidentiality." Id. at 838 n.
15. However, the SEC on appeal did not contest Dirks's interpretation of state law. Id. at
838. The court thus was bound by the presumption that Dirks did not learn of EFCA's
misdoings as a result of a corporate insider's tortious act.
106 See notes 37-42 and 55-60 supra and accompanying text.
107 See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
108 See note 105 upra.
109 681 F.2d at 838 & n.15.
110 Id. at 839 & n.16.
I l Id. at 837, 839.
112 Id at 838-39.
113 Id.
114 See note 27 supra.
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a breach by insiders is necessary to make their 'tippees' answerable
for acts that would have constituted a breach had they been commit-
ted by insiders." 15 Instead, the court applied a constructive breach
theory. It found that because Dirks's informants would have been
subject to the disclose-or-refrain constraints of rule 10b-5 had they
attempted to trade on their information, Dirks and hz tippees were
subject to the same liability. 116 Thus, even though the court did not
find that the informants had in fact breached any duty,"17 the court
held that Dirks, and by extension the five investors, became liable
when they traded in a way that would have been forbidden to their
informants. " 8
Although the court cited recent cases and secondary authorities
to support its proposition that an actual breach of a fiduciary duty is
not needed to trigger the disclose-or-refrain rule," 9 it did not set out
particularly helpful guidelines for applying its constructive breach
theory. Two important questions remain open. First, the court ex-
plicitly declined to "fix the outermost line" of its theory of liability
under rule 10b-5 without a breach of fiduciary or other state-recog-
nized duty. With little direct analysis of the facts or policies which
define the bounds of this liability, the court only noted of Dirks,
"[w]herever the line may be, this case is within it. ' ' 120 Second, it is far
from clear whether this theory of constructive breach of duty may be
put forth by the SEC only, or whether it is generally available to
plaintiffs in support of a private action.' 2 '
As an alternative to the theory of constructive breach, the court
put forward a second, more novel theory on which to uphold the
SEC's decision. Under this theory, "registered broker-dealers . . .
and those associated with them, like Dirks," owe a non-fiduciary
duty to the SEC and the public. 22 Earlier in its opinion, the court,
looking to Chiarella, recognized that "[b]ecause the disclose-or-refrain
duty is extraordinary, it attaches only when a party has legal obliga-
tions other than a mere duty to comply with the general antifraud
proscriptions in the federal securities laws."' 23 The court then found
115 681 F.2d at 839 n.16.
116 Id. at 839.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 839 & nn.16, 18.
120 Id. at 839; see also note 39 supra.
121 Id. at 839 n.19. "Our deference to an administrative construction [of rule lOb-5] in
this case does not imply that we would hold Dirks liable in a private action for damages." Id.
122 Id. at 840.
123 Id. at 837.
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wellsprings of just such "legal obligations," owed to the SEC and the
public at large, arising from the licensing procedures and high ethical
standards required of broker-dealers.' 24
This second theory, in effect, views registered broker-dealers and
their employees as a species of insider, and imposes on them the same
obligations articulated so explicitly in O'Conner for corporate insid-
ers. 125 Because they are licensed by the SEC, they owe a legal duty to
the SEC. By virtue of this duty, they are subject to a separate duty
under rule 10b-5 to the entire contemporaneously trading public.
26
This rationale raises the obvious policy question of whether reg-
istered broker-dealers should be subject to the same duties as corpo-
rate insiders. Their job, after all, is to collect information and pass it
124 Id. at 840. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)-(c) (1976); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d
434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). See also Jacobs, The Impact of fecurties
Exchange ACt Rule lob-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 869 (1972).
While the court cited authority from the language of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, its legislative history, and prior cases, 681 F.2d at 840-41, it left unclear the persons and
entities on which this duty to the SEC and the public falls.
The route by which Dirks acquired the duty, and its applicability to others along that
route, remained ill-defined. The court held Dirks liable for a breach of legal obligations in-
cumbent on registered broker-dealers. Yet the court placed Dirks in the class of "private
securities analysts," id. at 829, and there is no evidence that he was licensed by the SEC. One
would reasonably assume that the liability had descended to him through the obligations of
his employer, Delafield Childs, a registered brokerage firm. Yet the firm was not charged by
the SEC with any violations, and the court did not discuss the firm's possible involvement,
even in dicta. In fact, neither the court nor the SEC suggested that Delafield Childs may
have been implicated in Dirks's violations, either by imputation from Dirks's actions, for fail-
ing to supervise him properly, or for aiding and abetting its five censured clients. Nor does
the court hint that Dirks may have been acting outside the scope of his employment by inves-
tigating EFCA or passing his findings along to the firm's clients.
In light of the development of the law until this point, it is hard to understand why
Delafield Childs should not have been censured with Dirks for breaching its ethical obliga-
tions to the SEC and the public. Rule lOb-5 itself is a broad, catch-all antifraud measure,
and liability under it has been extended from corporate insiders to tippees and second-order
tippees. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, 495 F.2d 228; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833; Investors Management Co.,
44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). In addition, the securities laws place a duty on registered broker-dealers
to supervise their employees. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970). See a/so Jacobs, supra, at 963-
66. Thus the failure of the court and the SEC to consider the involvement of Delafield Childs
in Dirks's wrongdoing makes the underlying duty to the SEC and the public difficult to con-
ceptualize and apply in subsequent cases.
The Dirks court also failed to address any conflict of interest which may be raised by a
registered broker-dealer's duty to disclose under its ruling. See Jacobs, supra, at 871-81. Ja-
cobs suggests that if a conflict of interest arises between a broker-dealer's duty to his clients
and his duty to the public, the latter takes precedence. See Jacobs, upra, at 969 & n.577. See
also 1 BROMBERO & LOWENFELS, supra note 47, at § 5.6. See text accompanying note 19
uPra.
125 681 F.2d at 840. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
126 For a comparison with the language of O'Conner, see text accompanying note 87 supra.
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on to clients. In this respect they are ordinarily the agents of corpo-
rate and securities industry outsiders.' 27 Under Chiarella, broker-
dealers are already forbidden to use information obtained through a
breach of a corporate insider's fiduciary duty. Under Newman, they
may not use information which they have misappropriated in any
other way. These two prohibitions cover nearly every situation in
which broker-dealers or their employees might profit from inside in-
formation. In the light of the unusual facts of the case, one wonders
why the Dirks court created such a broad rule of a securities industry
insider's duty to the SEC and the public on such an unprecedented
foundation.
The first case, and only case to date to rely on Dirks is SEC v.
Cayman Islands Reinsurance Corp. 128 This decision illustrates the
problems which may attend an unchecked application of the Dirks
theory of lOb-5 liability predicated on the breach of a generalized,
undefined duty to the SEC and the public. In this case, the court
used Dirks to sustain the sufficiency of an SEC complaint against a
corporate director who had helped prepare a misleading prospec-
tus. 129 The SEC failed to allege a particular duty under which the
director was required to disclose his information. 130 Holding that the
complaint stated a claim, the court cited only Dirks in support of the
proposition that a duty to disclose "for one with the knowledge and
involvement alleged here . . . is inherent in the securities law."'
3'
The case is disturbing because in it the court apparently sanctioned
the SEC's use of a relatively blunt legal instrument, an amorphous
duty to the SEC and the public, when the securities laws provide
more precisely defined restrictions on acts of a director or other con-
trolling person.
If future courts find the Dirks rule too broad, the facts of the case
may limit its holding. The information that the Supreme Court
found Chiarella free to use to his own advantage concerned normal,
lawful business activity. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit held that Dirks
was not free to profit, however indirectly, from his undisclosed
127 The five clients to whom Dirks passed information about EFCA, however, were regis-
tered investment advisors, Boston Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,705, at 80,820-23, and presumably would share the duties of securities industry insiders
with Dirks and his employer.
128 [Current Vol.] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,717 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1982).
129 Id., 98,717, at 93,591.
130 Id. at 93,592.
131 Id. at 93,593. Thus the court in Cayman Islands, without explaining its action, extended
the Dirks theory of a general duty to the public and the SEC from securities industry insiders
like Dirks to corporate insiders.
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awareness of criminal activity. 3 2 Despite Dirks's role in exposing the
fraud at EFCA, the court found that the equities weighed against
him because he had concealed his knowledge of criminal activities so
that his clients might profit, or at least avoid otherwise inevitable
losses. The emotional center of Dirks is that "/pJrvale analysts may
not keep information they have discovered from the SEC, while their
clients dump fraudulent securities on the uninformed public 3 The court
accepted the proposition that the nature of the information the infor-
mants revealed about EFCA released them from their duty of confi-
dentiality.1 34 Future courts may read Dirks to mean that the nature
of the information-criminal activity-imposes a positive duty of
disclosure on licensed broker-dealers and those like Dirks who share
in their obligations.
III. Conclusion
Dirks has petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.135 A re-
view would provide the Court an opportunity to clarify questions
about the reach of rule 1Ob-5 which have arisen since Chiarella.
Newman, O'Conner, and Dirks, in enunciating a broad reading of
duty under section 10(b), seem to throw off the restraint which the
Supreme Court exhibited in Chiarella. If the Court thinks that rule
lOb-5 is being distorted beyond its intent, t3 6 it may wish to limit the
rule's application in the Dirks case and leave any further extension to
Congress or the SEC.
If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court declines to grant certi-
orari, the lower courts would still be free to interpret Dirks narrowly.
132 681 F.2d at 829, 841.
133 Id. at 829 (emphasis added). The court may also have reacted to the fact that the
clients, who profited at the expense of the "public," were all large investment firms, also
registered and therefore subject to market insiders' ethical responsiblities. See note 127 supra.
134 681 F.2d at 838. Like the question of the informants' breach of a fiduciary duty, see
note 105 supra, the SEC did not contest this issue on appeal. The court thus had to base its
decision on Dirks's assertion that the informants had no duty of confidentiality with regard to
EFCA's criminal activities.
135 51 U.S.L.W. 3140 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1982) (No. 82-276).
136 This appears to be the Justice Department's position. In a footnote to the SEC's brief
to the Supreme Court, the solicitor general notes that Dirks "was subject to no fiduciary
relationship with other traders." N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1982, at 32, col. 1. It also states that
"there was no element of misappropriation or other misconduct in obtaining or transferring
the information, and the information was legally available to others through the exercise of
diligence and acumen." Id. Finally, the solicitor general suggests that the D.C. Circuit's
decision might have an adverse effect on criminal law enforcement. Id. See also Justice Dept.
Breaks with SEC on Dirks' Equity Funding Censure [Current Vol.] Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 42, at 1843 (Oct. 29, 1982).
(Vol. 58:132]
THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Limiting the case to its facts, they could find that market insiders
need disclose to the SEC (or refrain from trading) lawfully obtained,
material, inside information only if it concerns a corporation's crimi-
nal misconduct. The courts should not follow Cayman Islands and use
Dirks as an all-purpose dragnet with which to catch corporate insid-
ers whose permitted range of activities Congress intended to regulate





As this piece was going to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Dirks. 1
37
137 51 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Nov. 15, 1982).
[October 1982]
